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Notes and Comment
Accord and Satisfaction: Payment of Smaller Sum.-In the case of
Sigler v. Sigler, r58 Pac. (Kans.) 864 (rg96), the defendant, the maker
of a note, employed one Wilson to go to the plaintiff, the holder of
the note and purchase the same for only a fraction of its face value.
Wilson made some false statements concerning the defendant's
financial condition, but, as the plaintiff was better acquainted with
the facts than Wilson was, the court found that there was no such
misrepresentation as to amount to fraud. The case then resolved
itself into the question whether a debtor can secure an accord and
satisfaction with a sum smaller than the debt, through the employ-
ment of an undisclosed agent. The court answered in the affirma-
tive.
It has long been the almost universal rule that, where a debt or
demand is liquidated and certain and is due, payment by the debtor
of a lesser sum and receipt by the creditor, even though it be agreed
by both parties to be in full satisfaction thereof, acts only as a
discharge pro tanto of the debt.' The reason for the rule is based
on hard logic rather than on common business understanding and
fairness. The legal reason for this result is that the debtor does
nothing he was not already obliged to do and thus there is no con-
sideration for the discharge. The harshness of such reasoning has
long been recognized in the courts.2 They seize upon the least
possible excuse to find consideration to give validity to the discharge.
In several states the legislatures have remedied the situation by
giving validity to all written discharges.4 There surely ought to be
Pinnel's Case, K. B. (Eng.) 3 Coke, Pt. V, I I7a (i6oo); Foakes v. Beer, L. R.
9 App. Cas. 605 (1884); Leeson v. Anderson, 99 Mich. 247 (1894); Mason v.
Campbell, 27 Mim. 5 (I88O); Varney v. Conery, 77 Me. 527 (I885); Fuller v.
Kemp, 138 N.Y. 231 (1893). Contra: Ford v. Hubinger, 64 Conn. 129 (1894);
Clayton v. Clark, 74 Miss. 499 (1896); and semble, Fyev. Hubble, 74 N. H. 358(,907).
2Brown v. Kern, 21 Wash. 211 (1899); Weis v. Marks, 2o6 Pa. St. 513 (1903);
New York State Bank v. Fletcher, 5 Wend. (N. Y. )85 (183o); Gordan v. Moore,
44 Ark. 349 (1884); Clark v. Abbott, 53 Minn. 88 (1893).3Payment of a debt before it is due: Weis v. Marks, supra, note 2; Baldwin v
Daly, 41 Wash. 416 (I9O6). Payment by a third person under no obligation to
pay the same, when accepted in full satisfaction is binding; Goodnow v. Smith,
18 Pick. (Mass.) 414 (1836); Jackson v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 66 N. J. L.
319 (i9o); Leavittv. Morrow, 6 Oh. St. 71 (1856); Snyder v. Pharo, 25 Fed. Rep.
398, 401 (1885); 2 Parsons, Contracts (8th ed.) 688; Fowler v. Smith, 153 Pa. St.
639 (1893); Clark v. Abbott, supra, note 2. Acceptance of a note endorsed by
sureties for part of the debt in satisfaction of the whole: Mason v. Campbell,
supra, note I; Varney v. Conery, supra, note I; Fuller v. Kemp, supra, note i.
Acceptance of a smaller sum where the debtor agrees not to go into bankruptcy:
Brown v. Kern, supra, note 2. Where the bond is lost, part payment when
received in satisfaction is good: Brenner v. Herr, 8 Pa. St. io6 (1848). So also
in the case where the debtor borrowed money from his banker, giving the latter
to understand that this sum was to be received in satisfaction of a bond and
mortgage on his premises for a greater amount: Dalrymple v. Craig, 149 Mo. 345,
360 (1889).
'For a list of states and sections of the statutes giving validity to written
discharges, see Corpus Juris, Accord and Satisfaction, see. 43.
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some mode in which one can dispose of that which is his own, as his
generosity or his best interests may prompt.
Under the state of facts in the principal case, namely, where the
payment was made by the agent of the debtor, the existence of such
agency not having been disclosed, and the creditor having believed
he was dealing with a third person, was the court warranted in finding
an accord and satisfaction of the debt? As we have seen by the
exceptions mentioned in the preceding paragraph, payment by a
third person of a sum less than the amount of the debt, when received
in full satisfaction is accord and satisfaction. Does the mere fact
that the payor was the agent of the debtor as undisclosed principal
destroy the validity of such an accord and satisfaction? This
question should in all justice and fairness be answered in the negative.
The creditor has been satisfied. He has received what in his judg-
ment he thought the claim was worth, or what he cared to accept
in place of his claim.
It is urged that, according to the rules of agency, the act of the
agent is the act of his principal, and that consequently in the principal
case, the payment by Wilson was the same as if the defendant
himself had paid part of the debt in satisfaction of the whole, and,
thus, the general rule, that the payment of a lesser sum is a valid
satisfaction and release pro tanto only, applies. A reply to this
contention can be found in the rule of agency that an undisclosed
principal is entitled to avail himself of the contract which his agent
made, even though the other party had no knowledge of the existing
relations'; and that one who contracts with the agent of an undis-
closed principal acquires a right to elect the agent as being the other
party to the contract, when the principal is later disclosed.
The creditor has received what in his judgment he thought his
chose in action was worth. He was satisfied by a payment not at the
hands of the debtor. The fact that the debtor furnished the consider-
ation for this satisfaction rather than the agent ought not in
fairness to destroy the validity of this satisfaction.
There is little authority on this precise question. Chitty states
the law as follows: "If the defendant and the party from whom the
satisfaction proceeded, stood in the relation of principal and agent,
such satisfaction would be a good bar for the defendant", 6 citing
Thurman v. Weld.7 The only case in this country exactly in point
is an early Vermont cases which holds contra to the principal case.
It would seem that the court in the Sigler case, with so little authority
to bind it, wisely adopted the rule of reason and justice in holding
the payment to constitute an accord and satisfaction.
The court further justified its decision under section 126 of the
Negotiable Instruments Law,9 which enumerates the various ways
'Gray v. Herman, 75 Wis. 453 (1890); 2 Parsons, Contracts (8th ed.), 688;
2 Chitty, Contracts (iith ed.), 133.
62 Chitty, Contracts (11th ed.), x133.
711 A. & E. (Eng.) 453, 460 (1804).
"Shaw v. Clark, 6 Vt. 507 (1834).
9Sec. 5372, Kansas General Statutes, 9o9.
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in which negotiable instruments may be discharged, among which is
the case "when the principal debtor becomes the holder of the
instrument at or after maturity in his own right". It held that unless
there be some principle of law which forbids the debtor to purchase
his own debt, the maker clearly became the owner in his own right.
A. A. Atwood, '17.
Constitutional Law: Constitutionality of Bulk Sales Statutes.-
By a unanimotts decision in Klein v. Maravelas', the New York
Court of Appeals has recently declared the Bulk Sales Law constitu-
tional. The decision of the case in the Supreme Court at Special
Term,2 which declared the same statute unconstitutional, was dis-
cussed in a previous issue of THE QuARTE1PLy.3 From the Special
Term decision an appeal was taken to the Appellate Division4 which
affirmed the lower court's decision but certified the question as to
the constitutionality of the Bulk Sales Law to the Court of
Appeals.
In its opinion the Court of Appeals expressly overrules the case of
Wright v. Hart' which was relied upon by the two lower courts as
the basis for their decision. In coming to its conclusion the court,
per Cardozo, J., said: "A very similar law was enacted in 1904
* * *. In Wright v. Hart ([19051 182 N. Y. 330) we held it to be
unconstitutional.* * * We think it is our duty to hold that the
decision in Wright v. Hart is wrong. The unanimous or all but
unanimous voice of the judges of the land, in federal and state
courts alike, has upheld the constitutionality of these laws. At the
time of our decision in Wright v. Hart, such laws were new and strange.
They were thought in the prevailing opinion to represent the fitful
prejudices of the hour (Wright v. Hart, supra, at p. 342). The fact
is that they have come to stay, and like laws may be found on the
statute books of every state. * * * * Back of this legislation,
which to a majority of the judges who decided Wright v. Hart seemed
arbitrary and purposeless, there must have been a real need. We
can see this now, even though it may have been obscure before.
Our past decision ought not to stand in opposition to the uniform
convictions of the entire judiciary of the land. * * * The
present statute is similar in essentials to the one condemned in 1o95.
In details it may be distinguished from the earlier one, but the details
are in reality trifling. We cannot without a sacrifice of candor rest
our judgment upon them. We think we ought not to do so. We
should adopt the argument and the conclusion of the dissenting
judges in Wright v. Hart and affirm the validity of the statute on
which the plaintiff builds his rights."
Frank B. Ingersoll, '17.
1219 N. Y. 383 (1916).
294 Misc. (N. Y.) 458 (1916).
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4173 App. Div. (N. Y.) 983 (i916).
' 1 8 2 N. Y. 330 (1905).
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Contracts: Consideraion.-In Teele v. Mayer, 173 App. Div.
(N. Y.) 869 (7976), the plaintiffs rendered services in the examination
of the books of two railroad companies under a contract made
between them and the defendant, acting in his capacity as president
of both roads. After a slight examination of the books, the plaintiffs
refused to go on with the work unless the defendant would personally
become responsible for payment. The defendant acceded to this
demand, and the plaintiffs went on and completed the work. The
companies did not pay for the services and the defendant was sued
upon his promise. The court, in reversing the decision for the plain-
tiffs, held that the plaintiffs, in their agreement with the defendant,
did no more than their contract with the railroad companies called
for, and, therefore, their continuance of the work was no consideration
for the promise of the defendant.
The result reached by the Appellate Division is consistent with
the New York view as previously stated,' and is accepted in the
majority of American jurisdictions.2 The performance or promise
to perform an existing contract is not a good consideration for a
promise by a third party. But there are a number of cases
contra.3
In Currie v. Misa4 the following definition of consideration is given:
"A valuable consideration in the eye of the law may consist either in
some right, interest, profit, or benefit accruing to one party, or some
forbearance, detriment, loss, or responsibility given, suffered or
undertaken by the other." Other similar definitions have been given
by various writers6 and judges.8 Consideration may be either some
benefit to the promisor or detriment to the promisee. But the
tendency has been to consider only the last element, namely, "detri-
ment to the promisee," and to ignore the notion of a "benefit to the
1Seybolt v. The N. Y., L. E. & W. R. R. Co., 95 N. Y. 562 (1884); Robinson v.
Jewett, 116 N. Y. 4o (1889); Arend v. Smith, 151 N. Y. 502 (1897); Deobald v.
Opperman, iii N.Y. 531 (1889); Wahl v. Barnun, 116 N.Y. 87 (1889); Carpen-
ter v. Taylor, 164 N. Y. 171 (1900).
2Johnson's Adm'r v. Sellers' Adm'r, 33 Ala. 265 (1858); Havana Press Drill
Co. v. Ashhurst, 148 Ill. 115 (1893); Peelman v. Peelman, 4 Ind. 612 (1853);
Ford v. Garner, 15 Ind. 298 (1868); Reynolds v. Nugent, 25 Ind. 328 (1865);
Ritenour v. Mathews, 42 Ind. 7 (1873); City of Newton v. Chicago, RockIsland
& Pacific Railroad, 66 Iowa 422 (1885); Putnam v. Woodbury, 68 Me. s8 (1878);
Sherwin & Co. v. Brigham, 39 Oh. St. 137 (1883); Wimer v. Worth Township,
104 Pa. St. 317 (1883); Hanks v. Barron Bros., 95 Tenn. 275 (1895); Kenigs-
berger v. Wixigate, 31 Texas 42 (1868).
'Humes v. Decatur Land Co., 98 Ala. 461 (1892); Abbott v Doane, 163 Mass.
433 (1895); Manettiv. Doege, 48 App. Div. (N. Y.) 567 (19oo); diclum in Merrick
v. Giddings, z Mack (D. C.) 394 (1882); Greene v. Kelly, 64 Vt. 309 (1892).
4L. R. Io Exch. 153, 162 (1875).
5'Consideration is something done, foreborne, or suffered, or promised to be
done, foreborne, or suffered, by the promisee in respect of the promise." Anson,
Law of Contract (IIth ed.), Ioo. "Any act or forbearance induced by the
promise." Harriman, Contracts (2d ed.), 43. "That which moves from the
promisee, or to the promisor, at the latter's request, in return for his promise."
Clark, Contracts (3d ed.), 133.
"'A benefit to the party promising, or a loss to the party to whom the promise
is made." Cook v. Bradley, 7 Conn. 57 (1828); Hamer v. Sidway, =4 N. Y. -538
(189i).
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promisor." This view has been advocated by authoritative
writers.7 The principal case was decided on this ground. There was
no detriment to the promisee because he was doing no more than he
was legally bound to do.
That is as far as the American courts," with a few exceptions, 9
go. But the promisor may have had some interest in the performance
of the contract. He may have received some benefit from it. If he
has received some benefit, there is good consideration. This latter
view is the rule in England0 and has been adopted in Massachusetts."
In Abbott v. Doanela the court said, "If A has refused or hesitated
to perform an agreement with B, and is requested to do so by C,
who will derive a benefit from such performance, and who promises
to pay him a certain sum therefor, and A thereupon undertakes to
do it, the performance by A of his agreement, is a good consideration
to support C's promise." This view is supported by Pollocku
and Langdell,1 but has been attacked by Clark 4 and Harriman.15 It
was adopted by the New York Appellate Division in Manetti v.
Doege,'6 ignoring apparently Arend v. Smith,17 where the New York
Court of Appeals applied the general rule.
A distinction has been suggested between actual performance of,
and a promise to perform, a contract duty with a third person.' 8
This distinction was recognized by a dictum in Merrick v. Giddings,9
where James, J., said: "A promise made in consideration of the
doing of an act which the promisee is already under legal obligation
to a third party to do * * * * is not binding, because it is not
supported by a valuable consideration. On the other hand, if the
promise is made in consideration of a promise to do that act * * *
then the promise is binding, because not made in consideration of
the performance of a subsisting obligation to a third person, but upon
a new consideration moving between the promisor and promisee."
But the distinction has been denied by Anson 0 and has not been
accepted by the courts. On principle no such distinction can be
maintained.
7Williston, 8 H. L. R. 27; Ames, 12 H. L. R. 519; Langdell, Summary of
Contracts, sec. 64.
3Supra, notes i and 2.
9Supra, note 3.
'
0Shadwell v. Shadwell, 9 C. B. (n. s.) (Eng.) 159 (186o); Scotson v. Pegg, 6
H. & N. (Eng.) 295 (1861).
"Abbott v. Doane, supra, note 3.
uaSupra, note 3.
nContracts (3d ed.), 161.
"Summary of Contracts, see. 84.
"Contracts (3 d ed.), 16o.
"Contracts (2d ed.), 68.18Supra, note 3.
"7Supra, note i.
18 Pollock, Contracts (1st ed.), 158; Langdell, Summary of Contracts,
sec. 84; and 14 H. L. R. 496; Professor Williston, in 8 H. L. R. 27, says that
Pollock changed his views in later editions of his work, but this is denied by
Professor Langdell in 14 H. L. R. 496.
1 9Supra, note 3.10Law of Contract (iith ed.), 123.
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The principal case is correct on authority and principle, if one
applies the definition of consideration in its restricted sense as a
detriment only. But if one were to apply the classic definition that
consideration may be either a benefit to the promisor or a detriment
to the promisee, the result of the English and Massachusetts doctrine
is correct. If the promisor contracts and receives a benefit, that
benefit should be sufficient consideration to support the promise,-
and it should make no difference that the act of the promisee, which
was beneficial to the promisor, was one that the promisee was already
legally bound to do. In Abbott v. Doane, supra, the promisor was an
officer, stockholder, and creditor of the corporation, and the court
found a benefit accruing to him, which was consideration for his
promise. In the principal case the promisor was an officer and
stockholder, and it is believed that the New York court might have
found some benefit derived by him which would constitute good
consideration for his promise.
Win. E. Vogel, '19.
Contracts: Misrepresentation of Market Value.-There seems to
be some diversity of opinion in the courts to-day as to whether a
statement of market value is a statement of fact or whether it is
merely a statement of opinion, or what is called "dealer's talk".
In Griesa v. Thomas, 161 Pac. (Kan.) 670 (ipr6), the plaintiff was
endeavoring to enforce a contract for the sale of catalpa trees, for
the purchase of which he had induced the defendant to contract by
making fraudulent statements as to the market value of the trees.
The court held in accordance with the well established rule' that,
where an unfamiliar kind of property is involved and its market value
is not easily ascertained, representations as to its market value are
statements of fact and not of opinion.
However, divergence of opinion arises where the facts are similar
to those given above except that the goods are not unfamiliar and
their market value could be learned by the use of reasonable diligence.
The weight of authority2 in the United States is undoubtedly that
under these circumstances the contract cannot be avoided. There
is, however, a little authority3 to the contrary and it would seem to be
based on at least equally good legal and logical grounds.
The issue is succinctly stated in an early Indiana case' "To
deprive the better informed, more enterprising, and more cautious
party of the benefit of his contract on account of misrepresentations
of the correctness of which the other party ought to judge for himself,
'Conlan v. Roemer, 52 N. J. L. 53 (1889); Bacon v. Frisbie, 15 Hun 26 (1878)
(reversed on other grounds in 8o N. Y. 394); Picard v. McCormick, ii Mich. 68(1862).
2Foley v. Cowgill, 5 Blaekf. (Ind.) 18 (1838); Cronk v. Cole, io Ind. 485(1858); Graffenstein v. Epstein & Co., 23 Kan. 443 (188o); Lilienthal v. Suffolk
Brewing Co., 154 Mass. 185 (I89I); Pearce v. Carter, 3 Houst. (Del.) 385 (1867).
'Seaman v. Becar, i5 Misc. (N.Y.) 616 (1896); Maxted v. Fowler, 94 Mich. io6
(1892), in which it was also stipulated that the party making fraudulent state-
ments must realize that the other party is relying upon them; Stoll v. Wellborn,
56 Atl. (N. J.) 894 (1903).
'Foley v. Cowgill, supra, note 2.
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would tend more to encourage ignorance, sloth, and recklessness than
to discourage dishonesty." This quotation furnishes the argument
for calling statements of market value mere opinions. Another
argument was pointed out by Justice Brewer, while a member of the
Supreme Court of Kansas, in a case5 which held that to consider
statements of market value statements of fact would encourage on
the part of one who had made a disadvantageous contract "mis-
construction of words, misrecollections and willful falsehoods," at
least as much as the vendor is encouraged to do similar acts under
the contrary rule. The fact that Justice Holmes pointed out,6
while a member of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
that that court at least had no "disposition to extend the decisions
in favor of vendors' representations beyond the limit to which they
have gone," may indicate that the court felt the rule concerning
these statements was a little too strict for modem conditions.
Statements of market value are upheld as statements of fact in
a New York Supreme Court case, on the following grounds,
as stated by the court in its opinion: "As demand fixes the
price, the statement of a fact tending to show that the article
in question can be sold for a certain sum is a most important element
in determining its value, and a careful and prudent person believing
such a statement to be true would be justified in the opinion and belief
that the property was worth at least the amount which another was
ready and willing to pay for it." In New Jersey the court has
satisfied itself by saying that a statement of market value is a state-
ment of fact.8
Frank G. Royce, '19.
Contract: Statute of Frauds: Promise to Answer for the Debt,
Default or Miscarriage of Another.-The case of Voska, Foelsch &'
Sidlo, Inc. v. Ruland, 172 App. Div. (N. Y.) 6r6 (1916), presents
an interesting phase of the important question as to when a promise
by a third person to a creditor to pay the debt of the debtor is within
the Statute of Frauds. In that case a corporation, of which the
defendant was a stockholder and vice-president, was engaged in
renovating a building and entered into a contract with the plaintiff
for certain marble work. The corporation became dilatory in making
payments and at a time when it was indebted to plaintiff for about
$2100, plaintiff became apprehensive that the corporation would
default in making final payments and decided to withdraw its work-
men and quit the work. Because he had so many of the corporation's
bonds and could afford no delay, the defendant, requesting plaintiff
to go ahead and complete the work, made the following oral promise
to plaintiff: "I guarantee you that you will get every dollar coming
to you for all the work, and if the corporation is not going to give
you a check, I am going to give you my personal check." Thereafter,
5Graffenstein v. Epstein & Co., supra, note 2.
sWay v. Ryther, 165 Mass. 226 (1896).7Seaman v. Becar, supra, note 3.
'Stoll v. Welborn, supra, note 3.
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in reliance on defendant's promise, plaintiff completed the work
and furnished materials to the value of about $415. In an action
against the defendant on his promise, it was held that as to the work
already performed at the time of the promise, the promise was an
oral agreement to answer for the debt of another and was unenforce-
able under the Statute of Frauds,' even if supported by a sufficient
consideration, but that the oral promise to pay moneys thereAfter
to be earned was not within the statute and was enforceable against
the promisor, being an independent promise founded upon a sufficient
consideration. This result is a departure from New York authority.
It is fundamental that the promise, to be within the statute, must
be collateral to the primary debt which continues to exist, and that
the promise is not within the statute if it is original. It is universally
held that the promise to pay the debt of another is original; (a) where
the promise runs to the debtor only and not to the creditor,2 (b) where
there never in fact was any primary debt at all; for example, C says
to B, "Let A have these goods and I will pay you"; 3 (c) where, once
existing, the primary debt ha- ceased to exist at the date of and by
virtue of the promise; for example, A owes B money and C says to B,
"Release A and I will pay you."'4
But suppose the promisor has promised the creditor to pay the
debt of A and the debt asA's debt also continuesto exist. Then under
what circumstances will the promise be original, and under what
circumstances will it be collateral? The early rule was that an oral
promise to pay the debt of another was always collateral and within
the statute whenever the primary debt continued to exist concurrently
with the promise. When this simple and easy test was discarded,
it became the rule that the promise to pay another's debt might in
some cases be original, even though the primary debt continued to
exist.
To clear up the doubt raised by the presence of such continued
liability of the debtor, it was decided in Leonard v. Vredenburgh5 that
the promise was original if "it was founded on a new or further
consideration of benefit or harm moving between the promisor and
the creditor-promisee". But since the consideration must neces-
sarily be "new" or "further" to support the new promise, and since
consideration is always either a harm to the promisee or a benefit
to the promisor, the rule laid down by this case seems rather broad
and dangerous, making it almost possible to say that a promise,
good at common law between the new parties, was good in spite of
the statute.6
'See sec. 31, N. Y. Pers. Prop. Law.
2Barker v. Bucklin, 2 Denio (N. Y.) 45 (1846). As to when the creditor can
sue the promisor in such case, see Lawrence v. Fox, 2o N. Y. 268 (1859).
:Fitzgerald v. Tiffany, 9 Misc. (N. Y.) 408 (1894).4Goodman v. Chase, i Barn. & Ald. (Eng.) 297 (188); American Wire & Steel
Bed Co. v. Schultz, 43 Misc. (N. Y.) 637 (1904).
58 Johns. (N. Y.) 29 (I8iI).6The Leonard case was evidently not followed in Smith v. Ives, 15 Wend.(N. Y.) 182 (1836), which held that where a promise is made to guarantee the
payment of a note, forbearance to sue the debtor is not a new consideration
which would take the case out of the statute.
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Correction of the error of the Leonard case was attempted in
Mallory v. Gillett,7 which held that the "new consideration" should
move to the promisor and be beneficial to him. This decision thus
excluded from the class of original promises all those, the consideraton
for which was merely a detriment to the promisee. The rule laid
down by this case was further narrowed and restricted by Brown v.
Weber,8 per Grover, J., in which it was decided that a promise might
still be collateral, even though the new consideration moved to the
promisor and was beneficial to him; that the existence of these
facts alone would not make the promise original, but that the further
inquiry would remain, whether such promise was independent of
the original debt or contingent upon it, i.e., if the promisor was
primarily liable, independently of the default of the debtor, the
promise was original, but if he was liable only in case of the default
of the debtor, the promise was collateral and within the statute.
In Ackley v. Par~mntr9 the court, following the rule of Mallory v.
Gillett, said that the feature which imparted to the promise the
character of an original undertaking was a new consideration moving
to the promisor and beneficial to him. The court did not even
mention Brown v. Weber and the limitation which that case put on
the rule of Mallory v. Gillett. The promise in the Ackley case was
not dependent and contingent upon the default of the debtor but
was an independent, absolute promise to pay. But since there was
no new consideration moving to the promisor and beneficial to him,
the promise was correctly held not to be original and thus the rule of
Brown v. Weber was not necessarily involved.
This was the state of the law upon this question when White v.
Rintouln° was decided. Finch, J., writing for the court, reviewed
the foregoing cases in an endeavor to clear up the whole question
and declared that these cases had ended in establishing the following
doctrine: "Where the primary debt subsists and was antecedently
contracted, the promise to pay is original when it is founded on a
new consideration moving to the promisor and beneficial to him
and such that the promisor thereby comes under an independent duty
of payment irrespective of the liability of the principal debtor."" In
this case the promise was held to be collateral and within the statute
on the ground that the consideration therefor was not beneficial
to the promisor, and the court mentioned as an added reason the
fact that the promise was contingent upon non-payment by the
debtor and that the promisor was not under an independent duty
of payment irrespective of the debtor's liability.
Just what did the Court of Appeals, speaking through Finch, 3.,
mean by the portion of the opinion above-quoted? Taking into
consideration the previous case of Mallory v. Gillett and the limitation
placed thereon by Brown v. Weber, the only reasonable construction
of Judge Finch's words is that, to stamp as original a promise to
pay the debt of another where the primary debt continues to exist,
72I N. Y. 412 (i86o). 838 N. Y. x87 (I868).
'98 N. Y. 425 (1885). 10IO8 N. Y. 222 (1888).
"Italics are the writer's.
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there must be two factors, viz., (a) a new consideration moving to the
promisor and beneficial to him, and (b) an absolute and independent
promise to pay, and not merely a promise to pay if the debtor does
not. For example, B is building a house for A, a mortgagor, and
threatens to quit, and C, the mortgagee, says to B, "Finish the work,
and I will pay you." In this case the added security to the
mortgagee-promisee and his interest in seeing the work completed
is a new consideration moving to and beneficial to him and the promise
is such that B could look to either, A or C for payment, and the
liability of neither would be dependent on the liability of the other,
i.e., in the words of Judge Finch, the promisor, C, has come under an
independent duty of payment irrespective of the liability of the princi-
pal debtor, A; the promise is original and is an agreement to pay
the promisor's own debt. But suppose that C's promise to B is in
this form: "Finish the work and I will pay you if A does not."
In such a case the consideration is the same as above, but C does not
come under an independent duty of payment irrespective of A's
liability, but the liability of C is contingent on the default of A,
i.e., the promise is collateral and is an agreement to answer for the
debt of another and is within the statute.
Thus, when a new, beneficial consideration is shown, the whole
matter then turns on the question whether the promise can be inter-
preted as "I will pay you" or "I will pay you if he does not." The
test is whether the person sought to be charged is primarily and
independentlyliable or only liable upon the contingency ofthe debtor's
default. The precise language used is not always significant. It
is the character of the obligation sought to be assumed and the inten-
tion of the parties and the circumstances surrounding the transaction
which are controlling.1
judge Finch's language in a later case 3 shows that the foregoing
is the true meaning of the doctrine laid down by him in White v.
Rintoul. In the later case he decided that the promise was original
because both features were present, viz., the new consideration
moving to the promisor and beneficial to him, and the promise in the
form, "I will pay you," bringing the promisor under an independent
duty of payment irrespective of the liability of the principal debtor.
While all the cases since have been in accord as to the necessity of
and as to the true meaning of "a new consideration moving to the
promisor and beneficial to him", it is aremarkable fact that some cases
have failed correctly to construe the language of White v. Rintoul
and thus have failed to demand the presence of the second feature
which makes the promise original, i.e., the promise in the form, "I will
pay you." Some cases, however, have recognized the rule that
12Almond v. Hart, 46 App. Div. (N. Y.) 431 (1899), in which it was held that
"I will see you paid" was equivalent to "I will pay you," and the promise was
held to be original because of the presence of the other necessary feature,-the
new, beneficial consideration.
13F. N. Bank v. Chalmers, 144 N. Y. 432 (1895).
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both features are necessary.14 Consequently where the promise
was in the form, "I will pay if he does not", this second feature was
not present and the promise was held to be collateral and within the
statute. 5 In other cases the courts have assumed that the question
whether the promise is original depends on the existence of the first
feature only,-the new, beneficial consideration."6 In nearly all of
these cases, however, the promise was in the form. "I will pay you",
and, therefore, the result reached was correct although the method
of reaching the result was incorrect. Of course, if there is no new
consideration moving to the promisor and beneficial to him, the
promise is not original.'7
In view of the construction here given to the doctrine of White v.
Rintoul, it is submitted that the learned court in the principal case
was in error in holding that the promise to pay for the work per-
formed subsequent thereto was original. In the first place, it is
difficult to see why the court drew a distinction between the promise
in regard to work already performed and in regard to work thereafter
to be performed. Clearly the promise was to pay the entire contract
debt of the corporation whenever that debt should or had come into
existence, and while the feature of a new, beneficial consideration,
namely, the interest which the promisor, as stockholder and vice-
president, had in seeing the contract completed, was present, yet
the second feature, the promise in the form, "I will pay you", was
absent. The promise was clearly in the form, "I will pay if the
corporation does not", and was, therefore, not an original promise,
but an oral agreement to answer for the debt of another and unen-
forceable under the statute. Several cases in which the facts were
similar to those of the principal case, but where the promise was in
the form, "I will pay you", have held that the contractor can recover
not only for work done and materials furnished subsequent to the
making of the new promise, but also for that which has been done
and furnished prior thereto.' Since these cases attempted no
distinction as to the tigie of the performance of the work, no distinc-
tion should have been made in the principal case, but the entire
promise should have been held to be collateral and, therefore,
unenforceable under the statute, since the oral promise was in the
form, "I will pay if the corporation does not".
While the court correctly held that the promise to pay for the
4Lipprnan v. Blumenthal, 29 Misc. (N. Y.) 335 (1899); Sinkovitz v. Apple-
baum, 56 Misc. (N. Y.) 527 (1907); Schild v. Eckstein Brewing Co., io8 App.
Div. (N. Y.) 50 (1905).
lZEno v. Gidoney, 154 N. Y. Supp. 104 (1915); McRoberts v. Mathews, 18
App. Div. (N. Y.) 624 (1897); Mechanics & Traders' Bank v. Stettheimer, Ix6
App. Div. (N. Y.) 198 (19o6).6Alley v. Turck, 8 App. Div. (N. Y.) 5o (1896); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hall,
31 App. Div. (N. Y.) 974 (1898); Merserau v. Washburn, 6 App. Div. (N. Y.)
404 (I896); Schwoerer & Sons, Inc. v. Stone, i3O App. Div. (N. Y.) 796 (19o9).
tBecker v. Krank, 62 App. Div. (N.*Y.) 514 (1901); Cardeza v. Bishop, 54
App. Div. (N. Y.) II6 (I900).18Reisler v. Silbermintz, 99 App. Div. (N. Y.) 131 (904); Manetti v. Doege,
48 App. Div. (N. Y.) 567 (1900); Boeff v. Rosenthal, 76 N. Y. Supp. 988 (1902);
Breen v. Isaacs, 49 Misc. (N. Y.) 127 (1905).
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antecedent work was conditional and collateral and an agreement to
pay the debt of another, it then attempted to justify its distinction
as to the work performed subsequent to the promise by citing Raabe v.
Squier.19 In that case the owners of a building made the following
oral promise to the sub-contractor: "That if plaintiff would go
ahead and deliver the rest of the material they would see him paid
therefor; that if the contractors [debtors] did not pay, they [defend-
ants] would take it out of the amount going to the contractors and
would pay the plaintiff." The promise related only to indebtedness
thereafter to be created, as all previous indebtedness had been fully
paid by the contractors. Since this case can be brought within the
doctrine of White v. Rintoul, as that doctrine is here construed,
Raabe v. Squier furnished no precedent for the position taken by
the court in the principal case. In Raabe v. Squier the promise,
"I will see you paid", is equivalent to "I will pay you", upon the
authority of Almond v. Hart.20 The words which followed the
promise were merely explanatory of the method by which the payment
was to be effected. Thus, these words did not change the form of
the promise which, due to the presence of the necessary new and bene-
ficial consideration, was an original promise within Judge Finch's
definition, and it was correctly held that the oral promise was not
within the statute. The promise in the principal case being in the
form, "I will pay if the corporation does not", the court should not
have relied on Raabe v. Squier.
It is, therefore, submitted that the definition of an original promise
laid down by Grover, J., in Brown v. Weber and by Finch, J., in
White v. Rintoul was not correctly construed by the court in the
principal case, and that it should have been held that the entire
oral promise was collateral and, therefore, unenforceable under the
Statute of Frauds.
Fred S. Reese, Jr., 'x8.
Contract: The Effect of War.-A distinctly novel legal situation
was presented by the comparatively recent case of Watts, Watts &'
Co., Ltd. v. Unione Austriaca di Navigazione, 224 Fed. (D. C., B. D.,
N. Y.) i88 (1915), affirmed 229 Fed. (C. C. A.) 136 (x915). A libel
was filed by the Watts Company, an English corporation, against
the Austrian corporation, to recover the contract price of coal sup-
plied to the respondents' steamers before the outbreak of the war.
The respondent admitted the indebtedness, but defended on the
ground that the ordinances of Austria prohibit the payment by
Austrian subjects to enemy subjects of any money during the existence
of war between their countries. In dismissing the libel without
prejudice, Veeder, J., held: "From the standpoint of this neutraljurisdiction the controlling consideration is that the law of both
belligerent countries forbids a payment by one belligerent subject to
his enemy during the continuance of war. This court in the exercise
19148 N. Y. 81 (i895).
2Supra, note io.
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of jurisdiction founded on comity, may not ignore that state of war,
and disregard the consequences resulting from it."'
Similar questions as to the effect of war upon the rights and
remedies of contracting parties have arisen in several recent state and
federal cases, and may be considered in several aspects, namely, the
effect of war upon (i) the contract relations of parties who are
citizens of belligerent states; (2) the contract relation of parties,
citizens of friendly states; (3) remedies in the courts of belligerent
and neutral states.
(z) Contracs Between Befligerent Parties
Under the continental view trading with the enemy during war is
permitted unless expresly prohibited; under the English view it is
prohibited unless expressly permitted. The American view2 is
substantially identical with the English view, and recognizes that
one of the immediate consequences of the commencement of hostili-
ties is the interdiction of all commercial intercourse between the
subjects of the states at war.8 Under the English Trading with the
Enemy Act4 it is a punishable misdemeanor for any British subject
to trade with the enemy after August 4, 1914. The Trading with
the Enemy Proclamation of September 9, 1914, as amended October
8, 1914, defines comprehensively what constitutes the offense.
Contracts with an alien enemy are valid as an exception to the
general rule, where a license, express or implied, has been granted.5
In Clarke v. Morey6, Chancellor Kent held that alien enemies having
a license to reside in the United States would have the implied
license to trade and consequently to sue or be sued. Opposed to
the American doctrine stood the early English decision of Alciator v.
Smith.7 But this decision seems to have been departed from recently
and the American view adopted by the English courts8 in interpreting
the Aliens Restriction (No. 2) order, dated August io, 1914. Con-
tracts of necessity, such as made by prisoners of war, constitute
another exception.9
In the case of contracts entered into before the outbreak of war, the
obligation of such contracts, both executory and executed, is not
dissolved or impaired, but the remedy is only suspended until the
'Appeal now pending before U.S. Supreme Court (No. 503, Oct. Term, 1916).
2The Wiliam Bagaley, 5 Wall. (U. S.) 377, 405 (1866); U. S. v. Lap6ne,
17Wall. (U. S.) 6oi (1873).
4The Meshona, 17 Supreme Court Reports (Cape of Good Hope) 135 (1900).
'4 and 5 Geo. V., chap. 87 (i914); Supplementary Proclamations dated Oct.
26, I914, Jan. 7, 1915, Feb. I6, Igi5.
,Tha Hoop, i Chan. Rob. I96 (I799); Trotter, "Law of Contract During
War" (914), Supplement (1915), p. 38.
IO Johns. (N. Y.) 69 (1813). See also Seymour v. Bailey, 66 II. 288 (1872).
73 Carnpb. 244 (z812).
'Princess et al v. Moffett, (1914) W. N. 379; followed in Volld v. Governors,
2 I. R. 543 (1914).
gForrestier v. Bordman, i Story (U. S.) 43; c. f. Hallet v. Jenks, 3 Cranch(U. S.) 210, 219 (X805).
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war is terminated, when the mutual obligations of performance and
the rights of action are revived.10 As expressed in the Watts case,
supra, "the contract is merely suspended during the war. The alien
enemy is not civiliter mortuus; he is merely in a state of suspended
animation." But contracts made before the outbreak of war will be
totally abrogated, not merely suspended, if of such a character as to
be incapable of suspension. Partnership contracts are of this nature
and war dissolves therelationship for practical reasons, sinceits proper
performance necessitates uninterrupted intercourse with the enemy
during war.' This qualification is operative generally in cases
where time is of the essence, e.g., in the case of contracts of insurance, 12
or where the parties cannot on the conclusion of peace be made
equal, for the doctrine of revival of contracts suspended by war is
based on equitable considerations. This exception, it would seem,
is sufficiently comprehensive to cover practically all cases beyond
the single case of executory contracts wholly performed on one side
and requiring only the payment of money on the other. In the
majority of cases, therefore, war has the effect of dissolving pre-existing
contracts, and in all cases makes void from its inception contracts
entered into during war.
The reason for this prohibition of commercial intercourse was
explained in an early casen: "In the law of almost every country
the character of alien enemy carries with it disability to sue. * *
If the parties who are to contract, have no right to compel the
performance of the contract, nor even to appear in a court of justice
for that purpose, can there be a stronger proof that the law imposes a
legal inability to contract? To such transactions it gives no sanction;
they have no legal existence; the whole of such commerce is attempted
without its protection and against its authority."
But, it seems, the doctrine has a more substantial basis than the
mere historical reason growing out of a procedural anomaly,-the
want of an ability to sue. Measures restricting commercial inter-
course are intended, obviously, to prevent the economic enrichment
of the enemy, just as military measures contemplate weakening him
physically. Sound public policy requires, therefore, that contracts,
which are of the essence of trading, be suspended or invalidated.
An appreciation of the essentially economic character of their object,
would confine the operation of restrictive measures strictly to purely
commercial transactions, and leave unaffected non-commercial
contracts (e.g., marriage) which have no tendency, directly or
indirectly, to increase the enemy's resources.
'
0Griswold v. Waddington, 16 Johns (N. Y.) 438 (1819); Janson v. Driefontein
A. C. 484 (1902); The William Bagaley, supra, note 2.
nGriswold v. Waddington, supra, note Io. See also Stevenson v. Aktien,
(I916) I K. B. 763; Distington Iron Co. v. Possehl & Co., (1916) I K. B. 811.
2N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Statham, 93 U. S. 24, 32 (1876); collection of authori-
ties in Abell v. Ins. Co., 18 W. Va. 400, 433 (188i); Moore's Int. Law Digest,
244 ff.
"aThe Hoop, supra, note 5.
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A different view is presented in a recent English prize court deci-
sion 4 wherein it is declared that war interdicts all intercourse between
the citizens of belligerents, "even intercourse which cannot fitly
be described as commercial". This seems to be an extension of
the doctrine of non-intercourse based apparently on the general
language contained in the Proclamation of September 9, 1914,
prohibiting British subjects "to enter any commercial, financial, or
other contract or obligation with or for the benefit of an enemy."
While several early American decisions 5 offer support to such an
interpretation, the tendency of the later cases 11 is in the direction of
limiting the doctrine to commercial transactions whose performance
is manifestly inconsistent with a state of war.
(2) Contracts Between Parties Not Alien Enemies
As outlined above, it appears that a state of war has the effect of
suspending or invalidating pre-existing contracts between belligerent,
parties. It may operate similarly to discharge pre-existing contracts
between parties not the citizens of hostile states, but for an entirely
different reason. In the former case, it is because of illegality; in
the latter, because of impossibility.
Impossibility, arising after the consummation of an absolute
contract, generally does not discharge the obligation to perform.'7
This is equally true of circumstances short of impossibility, e. g.
unexpected difficulty, inconvenience or added expense. But the
general rule applies only where the obligation of the contract is
unqualified and unconditional. 8 Three classes of apparent excep-
tions, as distinguished from cases where Act of God or vis major is
said to excuse, are recognized 19, namely, (i) legal impossibility
arising from a change in law;20 (2) non-existence of the specific thing
or circumstances essential to performance;21 or (3) incapacity for
personal service.2
Whether a state of war excuses performance of a pre-existing
contract under the second exception is, according to the modem
"The Panariellos, 32 T. L. R. 459 (1915); see also Robson v. Premier Oil
Co., L. R. 1915, 2 Ch. D. 124.15The Julia, 8 Cranch (U. S.) i8i (1814); The Rapid, ibid. I55, -leclaring
(p. 161): "If they meet, it is only in combat. War strips man of his social
nature * *." Brown v. U.S., ibid., 11o; see Baty and Morgan, "War, Its
Conduct and Legal Results", pp. 284, 296.
"Gray, J., in Kershaw v. Kelsey, 97 Am. Dec. 124 (1869), approved by Peck-
ham, J., Williams v. Paine, 169 U. S. 55 (1897).
17Paradine v. Jane, Aleyn 26 (1647); Ry. Co. v. Hooper, i6o U. S. 514, 527
(I895); Huffcut's Anson on Contracts, chap. 4.
1SHills v. Sughrue, 15 M. & W. 253 (1846); Avery v. Bowden, 5 E. & B. 714(i85s).
1OBaily v. DeCrespigny, L. R. 4 Q. B. 178, 185 (1869); Wald's Pollock (8th ed.),
p. 436.
20Buffalo East Side R. R. Co. v. Buffalo Street Railroad Co., ii N. Y. 132
(1888); Buffalo & Lancaster Land Co. v. Bellevue Co., i65 N. Y. 247 (1901).
21Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 B. & S. 824 (1863).22Spalding v. Rosa, 71 N. Y. 4o (1877).
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tendency, a matter of construction of the particular contract to
determine the intention of the parties.2 The statement of the New
York Supreme Court in the recent case of Marsk Realty Co. v.
Churchills24 is to this effect and the decision is manifestly sound.
In contracts between parties, the citizens of friendly states, con-
summated during war, impossibility arising out of war exonerates the
promisor, since the intention of the parties expressed in the contract
or imputed by law governs, and the ordinary risks of war are pre-
sumed naturally to have been with the contemplation of the parties.
(3) Remedkes
The effect of war upon the substantive rights of contracting
parties, which has been heretofore considered, is comparatively
well-settled. The remedial rights of an enemy citizen in the courts of
a hostile belligerent have been considered recently in a series of
cases; arising under the English Aliens Restrictions Act of August 5,
1914, and have been comprehensively defined. In an able opinion
delivered by Lord Reading, C. J., the Court of Appeal decided:
(i) the capacity of an alien enemy to sue was restricted by the
statute under interpretation to those complying with its provision.
It was also clearly pointed out that provisions of the Hague Conven-
tion2 did not operate to abrogate the doctrine that the alien's right
of action was suspended during war. (2) Whatever be his disability
to sue, he was liable to be sued.27 It followed that the alien could
appear and be heard in defense; that if judgment proceeded against
him, he had recourse to an appeal, but that he might not initiate an
appeal until after the conclusion of hostilities.
The status of belligerent parties in the tribunals of a neutral has
apparently never, until recently, been the subject of judicial considera-
tion. Because of the dearth of precedent and the disparity of view
which has developed, hostile belligerent parties occupy a rather
anomalous position in our courts at present. As an inevitable
consequence of the European War many cases pending at its out-
break were dismissed without prejudice because the isrues presented
questions which had become purely moot and academic. 28  In other
cases jurisdiction was declined. In the case of The Athanasios"
the opinion was expressed obiter dicta that "there is no compulsion
upon a court of admiralty to entertain such a suit [between Greek and
Canadian parties], and it is advisable to decline jurisdiction for
M Jacobs v. Credit Lyonnais, 12 Q. B. D. 589, 6o3 (1884); Trading Co. v.
cDonald Co., nl4Fed. 985 (1902); Millar & Co. v. Taylor & Co (1916) I
K. B. 402; Richards & Co. v. Wreschner, 174 App. Div. (N. Y.) 484 (Iw6).249o Misc. (N. Y.) 370 (1915). See also Thaddeus Davids Co. v. Hoffman-
LaRoche Chemical Works, 16o N. Y. Supp. 973 (1916).25Porter v. Freudenberg, 3I T. L. R. 162 (1915); 5 Brit. Rul. Cas. 583, ff.26Art. 23, sec. h, of chap. I, sec. 2, 1907.
27McVeigh v. U. S., ii Wall. (U. S.) 259, 267 (1870).
28U. S. v. Hamburg-Amer. S. S. Co., 239 U. S. 467 (i915), reversing 216 Fed.
971 (1914), followed in U. S. v. Amer. Asiatic S. S. Co., decided by the U. S.
Supreme Court, Jan. 22, 1917.
29228 Fed. 558 (19x5).
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political reasons." This is manifestly a legitimate exercise of the
discretionary functions of courts of admiralty.3 0
The ruling in the Watts case, supra, was followed, in respect to
the jurisdictional question involved, in the case of The Kaiser
Wilhelm II.31 Referring to the Watts case, Haight, J., was of
opinion that no reasonable basis of distinction existed in principle
between the two cases.
Contrasted with the holdings in the above case, is the recent
decision of the New Jersey Court in Compagnie Universelle v. U. S.
Service Corporation.82 The facts were substantially as follows:
A German company contracted, before the war, to construct for a
French company a wireless station. The performance of the agree-
ment was prohibited by the subsequent laws and ordinances of
both France and Germany. On a bill for specific performance to
convey the land the question arose as to the propriety of a neutral
court exercising jurisdiction. Held, that there is no more appropriate
tribunal elsewhere, as the land is situated in New Jersey, and hence
the reason for usually declining discretionary jurisdiction is
wanting.
There is thus presented a decided diversity of judicial opinion
as to the propriety of the neutral court entertaining a suit between
belligerents.33 The federal view is sought to be supported by a
common law of nations, of which the enactments and decrees are
but declaratory. As indicated in an earlier paragraph, the trading
with the enemy proclamations are promulgated by municipal
authority, and bind only the citizens of the local jurisdiction. The
fortuitous circumstance that they are uniform in the several countries
does not make them a part of international law. These essentially
municipal regulations, it is submitted, can have no extra-territorial
effect, for the acceptance of this doctrine implies the yielding of
American sovereignty to that extent. It follows from a recognition
of this view that the recent decision in Taylor v. Konchakii,4 which
gave effect to the terms of the French moratorium, is manifestly
unsound. The error of the courts adhering to the view adopted in
the principal case is apparent when the foreign restrictions are viewed
as penal enactments, to which courts exercising jurisdiction on
grounds of comity can give no effect. Undoubtedly it was intended
that the restrictive decrees should prohibit only voluntary payments
to enemy subjects, and were not meant to apply to involuntary
payments decreed by a competent court. The adoption of the
preferable New Jersey doctrine does not militate against the strict
maintenance of neutrality, for the right to maintain suits is extended
impartially to all belligerents. "The neutral nation is a friend of
"The Belgenland, 114 U. S. 355 (1885).
:123o Fed. (D. C., S. D., N. Y.) 717 (1916).
29. Atl. (N. J.) x87 (1915).
3This question is indirectly involved in the case of The Appam, 234 Fed.
(D.C.,E. D., Va.) 389 (i9x6); see Diplomatic Corresp. of Dept. of State, reprinted
in xo Sp. Suppl. Am. J. Int. L. 392, Oct., 1916.
2456 N. Y. L. J. 813 (1916); note 3o Har. L. R. 39o, February, 1917.
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both belligerents and comity requires that the doors of its courts be
open, if their subjects have wrongs to be righted.""
Alex. M. Hamburg, 'x6.
Corporations: Liability of Original Stockholder after Transfer
of Stock.-In Chilson v. Cavanagh, I6o Pac. (Okl.) 6oI (r916), the
trustee in bankruptcy of an insolvent corporation sought to recover
from an original stockholder of the company an amount alleged to be
unpaid on his shares sufficient to equalize the total assets and liabili-
ties of the corporation. The court found that a lease, in exchange
for which the stock had been given, was substantially worth the par
value of the shares so that it could not be claimed that the stock
was issued without consideration. The defendant was sued as the
person to whom the stock was originally issued and not on the ground
that he was the owner and holder of it at the time of the commence-
ment of the action. The Oklahoma Constitution' provided, in
substance, that no corporation should issue stock except for money,
labor done, or property actually received to the amount of the par
value of the shares. The following statement of law was made:
"The liability thus imposed upon one who, by accepting corporate
stock, as an original shareholder, obligates himself to pay the corpora-
tion therefor in money or its equivalent is a continuing one, at least
as far as creditors of the corporation in good faith are concerned,
and is not discharged by mere transfer of such stock to an innocent
holder, otherwise one who had contributed little or nothing to the
capital stock of a corporation might obtain shares of its stock,
dispose thereof profitably, and entirely escape liability to corporate
creditors."
It would seem from the language of the court that it is inclined to
view the subscription to stock as a contract by the subscriber to pay
the full value thereof and that, therefore, the liability exists after a
transfer has caused the relationship of stockholder to cease. But
may not the view be equally well taken that by accepting stock the
subscriber merely agrees to assume the relation of a stockholder to
the corporation and that, when such relationship comes to an end,
his liability ceases? Is not the liability which attaches to a stock-
holder inseparable from the ownership of the stock? One of the
essential attributes of a corporation is its capacity to perpetuate
itself through the transfer of its shares from one person to another.
Aid, as remarked in Visalia R. R. Co. v. Hyde :2 "If the original
stockholders stand under different relations to the company from their
assigns, the corporation itself loses some of its attributes by the
substitution or else becomes introduced into more complicated
relations." It would seem clear also that, where a corporation has
issued stock as fully paid there cannot be a contract obligation to
3
'Compagnie v. U. S. Serv. Corp., supra, note 32.
'Art. 9, sec. 39, Vol. i, Revised Laws of Okla. (I91O).
211o Cal. 632 (i895). The contract idea is espoused in Hood v. McNaughton,
54 N. J. L. 425 (1892), where it is said that the subscriber cannot recede without
the consent of the company.
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pay full value, since there is an express agreement to the contrary.
The view in the principal case was undoubtedly influenced by the
desire of the court to render the constitutional provision an effective
remedy against the evil intended to be cured by it, namely, stock-
watering.
The authorities are not in accord upon the matter. If by the
words "mere transfer" the court in the principal case intended to
include a formal transfer, its opinion would seem to be against the
weight of authority in this country, which holds that a stockholder's
liability for unpaid subscriptions does not continue after a transfer
to a bona fide holder, except where the transfer is made with the
intent of defrauding creditors of the corporation. 3 This general
doctrine is subject to limitations, however. (i) The transfer must
be to a solvent person, as a transfer to an irresponsible person would
be a fraud upon creditors.4 The stock subscriptions are assets of
the corporation and, where corporate liabilities are incurred, such
assets are pledged as security to those lending credit to the corpora-
tion. A transfer to an irresponsible party would impair that security
and should be held not bona fide, even where the transferror does not
do so to avoid his liability. (2) Where the transfer is made while
the corporation is insolvent, the transferor is not discharged even
though there was no actual intent to defraud creditors.5 After
insolvency there cannot be any legitimate traffic in the shares.
Thus, a sale of stock without consideration while the corporation
was insolvent was held fraudulent as to creditors.6 But where at
the time of the sale the corporation was solvent, a sale, though not
upon valuable consideration, to a responsible person and not with
the intent of escaping liability operated to divest the transferror of
his liability.7 (3) It follows, of course, that the transfer of shares of
stock in an insolvent corporation or in view of the anticipated insol-
vency of the corporation to a person incapable of responding to the
liability imposed upon him by the transfer does not discharge the
original stockholder.8 In England the doctrine prevails that stock
of a failing corporation may be transferred to an irresponsible person,
3Henderson v. Mayfield Woolen Mills, 153 Ala. 625 (1907); Parkhurst v.
Mexican Southeastern R. R. Co., 102 Ill. App. 507 (I902); McConey v. Belton
Oil & Gas Co., 97 Minn. 19o (19o6); Rochester & K.F. Land Co. v. Raymond,
358 N. Y. 576 (1899); Cole v. Adams, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 507 (1898); Rich v. Park,
B77 S. W. (Tex.) 184 (1915); and see a valuable note in 93 Am. St. Rep. 349.
But in Wolcott v. Waldstein, 97 At. (N. J.) 951 (1916), incorporators to whom
stock was originally issued without payment were held liable despite a subsequent
transfer.4Rider v. Morrison, 54 Md. 429, 444 (880); Nathan v. Whitlock, 9 Paige's Ch.
(N. Y.) 352 (1841); and see 2 Morawetz, Corporations, sec. 858.
51 Morawetz, Corporations, see. 166.6Ward v. Joslin, oo Fed. 676 (1go); McConey v. Belton Oil & Gas Co.,
supra, note 3.7Parkhurst v. Me-ican Southeastern R. R. Co., supra, note 3.
sWelch v. Sargent, 127 Cal. 72 (1899); Rider v. Morrison, supra, note 4;
Nathan v. Whitlock, supra, note 4; Burt v. Real Est. Exch., 175 Pa. St.
619 (1896); Rich v. Park, supra, note 3; Bowden v. Johnson, 107 U. S. 251
(1882); see also 26 A. & E. Encyc. of Law, p. 1o35; 2 Morawetz, Corporations,
sec. 858.
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a "man of straw", even though the sole purpose of the sale is to
avoid the stockholder's liability for unpaid subscriptions, where
the transfer is an absolute one.9 Such out-and-out transfer releases
the transferror from liability to corpc:.::e creditors and to the other
stockholders.
The basis of the doctrine thata bonafide sale releases the transferror
is that there is a complete novation by which the transferee steps
into the shoes of the transferror, acquiring his rights and liabilities.'
It is obvious, therefore, that (4) if the person to whom the stock is
transferred has no notice when he purchases it that it is not fully paid,
the transferror still remains liable." The transferee cannot assume
an obligation of which he had no knowledge. It is also held that,
where stock is purchased in good faith and without notice in the open
market, such stock is to be deemed fully paid and purchasers in
good faith protected, even though there is nothing on the face of
the stock certificates to indicate that they are fully paid." The
reasons given for the rule are that it encourages the transfer of per-
sonal property, favors the quasi-negotiability of stock and discoun-
tenances secret liens and constructive notice.
The general rule would appear to require that in order to discharge
the transferror, a formal transfer upon the books of the corporation
be made or any other formalities necessary to a complete transfer
be complied with." The creditor is entitled to hold him liable whose
name appears upon the corporate books as the owner of the stock
and, until such transfer is entered, no substitution takes place.
If there is a failure to so register a transfer, the liability does not
shift to the transferee, unless the corporation has waived performance
of the required formalities in some manner. Thus, where a corpora-
tion failed to provide a register and a transfer in it was made essential
to pass title, performance of its rules was held to have been waived.4
'De Pass's Case, 4 De G. & J. 544 (1859); Master's Case, L. R. 7 Ch. App. 292(1872); Re Taurine Co., L. R. 25 Ch. D. i8 (1883); I Cook, Corporations (7th
ed.), sec. 266.
'
0in re People's Live Stock Co., 56 Minn. 18o (1894); Sigua Iron Co. v. Brown,
171 N. Y. 488 (1902); Rich v. Park, supra, note 3; Websterx. Upton, 91 U. S.
65 (1875); x Machen, Corporations, sec. 765; 2 Morawetz, Corporations, see. 858.
nMcBryan v. Univ. Elev. Co., i3O Mich. III (1902); Easton Nat. Bank v.
Amer. Brick & Tile Co., 69 N. J. Eq. 326, 334 (19o5); French v. Harding, 235 Pa.
St. 79 (1912); Rich v. Park, supra, note 3.
nFrench v. Harding, supra, note ii; but see Perkins v. Cowles, 157 Cal. 625(i9IO), where the court holds the proposition untenable on the ground that stock
certificates do not constitute negotiable paper.
"Cole v. Adams, supra, note 3; I Cook, Corporations (7th ed.), sec. 255; I
Machen, Corporations, sec. 765; 4 Thompson, Corporations, sec. 4910. In
Henderson v. Mayfield Woolen Mills, supra, note 3, the court speaks as follows:
"A creditor of the corporation is fully protected as to any unpaid balance due
upon subscriptions, whether there has been a formal transfer or not, as the
transferee would be liable and answerable if solvent and if insolvent and the
corporation was insolvent at the time of the transfer the transferor would be
liable, whether the transfer was formally made and registered or not." It is
there contended that statutes providing for registration are not for the protection
of creditors of the corporation.
"Isham v. Buckingham, 49 N. Y. 216 (1872).
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One should not overlook the fact, however, that though the transfer
is valid as between the parties and creates equitable rights in favor
of the vendee, it may be ineffectual to relieve the vendor from
liability for unpaid subscriptions.15 Where there is a complete
transfer, it would seem that an argument such as was made in the
principal case to the effect that an original stockholder whose shares
were not paid up might dispose of them profitably, thus avoiding
liability, would be negligible, since another liability, that of the
transferee, is substituted therefor.
In New York it is provided by statute6 that the stockholder shall
be liable for unpaid subscriptions to his stock, if suit is brought
against him within two years after he has ceased to be a stockholder.
If an action is not brought within that time he ceases to be liable to
corporate creditors.
Leonard G. Aierstok, '17.
Elections: Student Voting.-The cases of Seibold v. Wahl, i59
N. W. (Wis.) 546 (1916), Gross v. Wahl, id., 549, Ashbahr v. Wahl, id.,
549, and Wadsworth v. Wahl, id., 550, illustrate the conditions and
circumstances under which students of a college may be allowed to
vote in local elections of the city in which the college is located.
On March 21, i916, four law students of the University of Wisconsin
attempted to vote at the primary election held in the city of Madison,
and, upon being prevented by the inspectors of the election, they
commenced separate actions to recover damages for such refusal.
Each of the students was twenty-one years of age, unmarried, owned
no property and paid no taxes, and came to Madison to attend the
law school, not knowing where he would go after graduation, but
declared that Madison was his present residence within the meaning
of the Wisconsin statutes. The parents of the student in the Wads-
worth case, supra, resided in Kentucky and he spent the last Christmas
vacation there, but intended to remain in Madison during the next
summer. Save the $25o he earned as editor of the Badger, the rest
of his expenses were paid by his father. The order sustaining the
demurrer to his complaint was afrmed. The student in Seibold v.
Wahl, supra, registered in the University as being from Camp
Douglqs, Wisconsin, the home of his parents, who also paid part of
his expenses while in college. The order overruling the demurrer
to his complaint was reversed. The registration list of the univer-
sity showed that Gross, the plaintiff in Gross v. Wahl, supra, was from
La Forge, Wisconsin. He had spent the last summer vacation at
his parents' home in that place. He had taught school, however,
in another county for three years and had voted there. He borrowed
part of the money to pay expenses from his father and earned the
rest. The orderoverrulingthedemurrer to his complaint was affirmed,
as he was held to be entitled to vote. The other student, in Ashbahr
v. Wahl, supra, came from Oregon, where he had taught school and
15Giesen v. London & Northwest Amer. Mortg. Co., 102 Fed. 584 (19oo).1 Stock Corporation Law, see. 59; Laws 19o9, ch. 61.
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voted at a different place than that where his parents reside. He
registered in the university as of Madison, but had not spent his
vacations there. He was entirely self-supporting. The court
held that he had gained a voting residence. From the facts of
these four cases it seems that the circumstances which made the last
two students eligible to vote were: (i) financial emancipation as
evidenced by their independent self-support, and (2) political emanci-
pation as shown by the prior acquisition of a residence separate
from that of their parents and the exercise of the right. to vote at
the place of that residence. It is to be noted that no distinction is
made between students whose parents live outside of Wisconsin and
those who live within that state.
Naturally the individual state statutes govern the cases within
the particular state, but the purpose and effect of the Wisconsin
statutes' appear to be merely for the direction and guidance of the
election boards in their determination of conditions necessary for
one to acquire a voting residence.. The statutes apparently do not
change the general legal principles regarding residence. These
principles are set out by Winslow, Ch. J., in one of the cases as
follows :2 "To acquire a voting residence in an election district one
must have made it his fixed habitation; (i) for no merely temporary
purpose; (2) without present intention of removal elsewhere or to
return to his former abode for residence purposes; and (3) with
intention of returning to such habitation whenever absent therefrom.
The purpose is not necessarily temporary because it is expected
to end at some time more or less remote in the future. Practi-
cally all human purposes have this quality. * * * Two general
propositions may be laid down, viz., if the student, * * * being
separated from his father's family and earning his own way wholly
or substantially, * * * * removes to the college town, these
are persuasive circumstances more or less conclusive tending to show
an acquirement of a voting residence there: if on the other hand,
he have a father or mother living, who maintains a family residence
in another town, to which residence the student returns in vacation
time, and if such parent supports the student wholly or substantially,
these are quite persuasive circumstances tending to show that there
has been no change of voting residence, especially if the student
registers or describes himself as of such family residence."
A conflict exists among the American jurisdictions as to what
1Wisconsin Statutes; Laws of 19x5, Ch. 65I:
"2d. That place shall be considered and held to be the residence in which his
habitation is fixed, without any present intention of removing therefrom, and to
which whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning."
"3d. A person shall not be considered or held to have lost his residence who
shall leave his home and go into another state or county, town or ward of this
state for temporary purposes merely, with an intention of returning."
"4th. A person shall not be considered to have gained a residence in any town,
ward or village of this state into which he shall have come for temporary purposes
merely."
"9th. The mere intention to acquire a new residence, without removal, shall
avail nothing; neither shall removal without intention."2Siebold v. Wahl, supra.
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intent is necessary to acquire a new voting residence. The earlier
and more strict view is illustrated in Fry's Election Case3 where
students who "support themselves, are emancipated from their
father's families, have left the home of their parents, and never
intend to return and make it a permanent abode," yet are held not
to have the right to vote at the place in which the college is situated
because, having come there "for no other purpose than to receive a
collegiate education, and intending to leave after graduating, they
have not lost their home domicile. * * * Emancipation from their
father's family and independent support, and leaving the home
belonging to their parents, have not forfeited their own domicile.
The father's house is not necessarily their home, but the place is
where it is." The court's reasoning is strained on the face of it.
If one, who is sui juris, does not lose his domicile at a particular
place by leaving it, with the intention never to return to it as a place
of abode, how can a domicile be lost? If it is admitted that an
intention of abandonment accompanies the fact of removal from
particular place, a loss of domicile in that place necessarily follows.
The difficulty in these cases is to prove a bona fide intent on the part
of the student to renounce his former domicile. Several state courts4
have followed Pennsylvania in applying Vattel's definition of domicile
or settlement as being "the habitation fixed in any place, with the
intention of always staying there,"6 to residence, by holding that the
intention to remain in a place permanently or for some indefinite
time is essential. The lower courts7 of Pennsylvania have refused
to follow this strict rule, although the constitution of that state was
changed in order "to conform to the decision of the Supreme Court
rendered by Agnew, J., in Fry's case," supra.8
In contradistinction to the rule requiring an intent to make a
permanent residence, other courts have said that, "it is not neces-
sary * * * * that there should be an intention to remain
permanently at the chosen domicile: it is enough if it is for the time
the home of the voter to the exclusion of other places."9  Judge
371 Pa. St. 302, 303, 311 (x872).
'Kelly, Ex'r. v. Garrett, Ex'r., 67 Ala. 304 (1880); Vanderpoel v. O'Hanlon, 53
Ia. 246 (i88o); State v. Daniels, 44 N. H. 383 (1862).
;Hall v. Schoenecke, 128 Mo. 661 (1895); Welch v. Shumway, 232 Ill. 54, 86(1908).6Vattell, Law of Nations, Bk. i, c. ig, sec. 218.7
"Sometimes it-[residence] is dtfined as the permanent place of abode. But this
is not accurate; for, while a certain degree of permanency is essential, absolute
permanency is not required." Lower Oxford Contested Election, i Chester Co.
Rep. (Pa.) 253, 254 (1875). And a student "may intend to go elsewhere when his
studies are over: but, if he has no other home while present at the institution,
if he has no fixed place to which he intends to go when his undergraduate period
is over," if he elects to become a citizen of that place, he has a right to vote.
In re Lower Merion Election, I Chester CO. Rep. (Pa.) 257, 259 0i880).
Un re Lower Merion Election, supra, note 7.
'Pedigo v. Grimes, 113 Ind. 148 (1887); accord, Putnam v. Johnson, io Mass.
487,499 (1813); Opinion of the Justices, 46 Mass. 587 (1843); Hall v. Schoenecke,
supra, note 5; Shaeffer v. Gilbert, 73 Md. 66 (189o); Berry v. Wilcox, 44 Neb. 82(1895); Matter of Barry, 164 N. Y. 18 (Igoo). Ch. 46, see. 66 of Ill. Statutes
(Jones & Add., Sec. 4791) provides that a "permanent abode is necessary to
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Irvine, in the well considered Nebraska case of Berry v. Wilcox,'0
points out that "the older cases and some of the modem ones require
as an essential element the animus manendi, and construe this term
as meaning an intention of always remaining," but other courts
have combatted this construction of the term and, after quoting
Putnam v. Johnson and Dale v. Irwin," he continues, "These
authorities, we think, present the law in its true aspect. The fact
that one is a student in a university does not of itself entitle him to
vote where the university is situated, nor does it prevent his voting
there. He resides where he has established his home, the place
where he is habitually present. * * * The fact that he may at
a future time intend to remove will not necessarily defeat his residence
before he actually does remove. It is not necessary that he should
have the intention of always remaining, but there must co-exist the
fact and the intention of making it his present abiding place, and
there must be no intention of presently removing." Diceyu sup-
ports this contention. He says: "The term animus manendi, or
intention of residence, is intended to include the negative state of
mind which is more accurately described as 'the absence of any
present intention not to reside permanently in a place or country.'
The Wisconsin court in the principal cases, supra, has followed this
view.
The cases thus far considered have arisen under constitutions
providing that one must be a resident or inhabitant of the state and
district for a certain period in order to be qualified to vote. These
words thus employed "mean substantially the same thing". 3 Some
eighteen states, however, have followed New York by expressly
providing in their constitutions that: "For the purpose of voting,
no person shall be deemed to have gained or lost a residence, by reason
of his presence or absence * * * while a student in any seminary
of learning. * * * ".14 The mischief against which these sections
are aimed has been said to be "the participation of an unconcerned
body of men in the control through the ballot box of municipal
affairs in whose further conduct they have no interest, and from
constitute a residence," but the courts have interpreted this not to mean "an
abode which the party does not intend to abandon at any future time," for this
"would be a definition too stringent for a country whose people and characteristics
are ever on the change. No man in active life, in this state can say, wherever
he may be placed, this ever shall be my permanent place of abode." Dale v.
Irwin, 78 Ill. 170, i8i (1875). And in Welch v. Shumway, supra, note 5, it is
held, that a student is entitled to vote if he "regards the place where the college
is situated as his home, even though he may at some future time intend to remove,
if he has no positive and fixed intention as to where he will locate when he leaves."
"oSupra, note 9.
"Supra, note 9.
uThe Conflict of Laws (Am. ed.), p. 81, note 2.
"Cooley, Constitutional Limitations (7th ed.), p. 903.
14N. Y. Constitution, Art. II, see. 3. The other states are: Ariz., Art. VII,
sec. 3; Cal., Art. II, sec. 4; Colo., Art. VII, sec. 4; Ida., Art. VI, sec. 5; Kan.,
Art. V, see. 3; La., Art. 208; Me.,Art. 11, sec. i; Mich., Art. III, sec. 2; Mo.,
Art. VIII, sec. 7; Mont., Art. IX, sec. 3; Nev., Art. II, sec. 2; N.M., Art. VII,
sec. 4; Ore., Art II, see. 4; Pa., Art. VIII, sec. 13; S. C., Art. II, see. 7; Va., Art.
IU,sec. 24; Wash., Art. VI, see. 4.
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the management of which by the officers their ballots might elect,
they sustain no injury."'' These provisions have been interpreted
in a number of cases. "The accepted rule seems to be that the
effect of such a constitutional provision is not to disqualify a student
from gaining a residence at the seat of the institution he is attending,
but to render his presence or absence from the institution primarily
without effect as to his political status."'6  Thus, if one acquires a
voting residence at the place where the college is located before he
attends the school, such attendance will not disqualify him from "
voting.17 But mere presence at the school together with a declaration
of intention to become a resident, 8 although such intention is declared
in a letter to the mayor of the town and to the board of supervisors,' 9
is not sufficient to entitle him to become an elector. Nor will the
attendance at a seminary which requires that a student must renounce
"all other residences, or homes save that of the seminary itself
give a voting residence." 20  But where a student voted in Virginia,
moved to New York, wrote a letter ordering his name taken off of
the registration list in Virginia, applied to be received as a postulant
in the ecclesiastical diocese of New York, and entered a seminary in
Yonkers, it was held that he had changed his legal residence and could
vote in Yonkers.21 Judge Finch, in the leading New York case of
Matter of Goodman,2 stated the rule to be, that the facts to establish
a change in the legal residence of a student "must be wholly inde-
pendent and outside of his presence in the new district as a student,
and should be very clear and convincing to overcome the natural
presumption" against such a change. In a later case it was pointed
out that "unless the rule laid down in the Goodman case is rigidly
enforced the constitutional provision will be nullified." And although
"it may be urged that the enforcement of this rule will render it
well nigh impossible for a student to establish a residence in a seminary
of learning, [yet] the very obvious answer is that the letter and spirit
of the constitution contemplate such a result."'' Since there are
no unequivocal facts, independent of the attendance at the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin, in any of the leading cases, supra, it follows that
none of the plaintiffs would have been allowed to recover under the
New York view, although no general rule can be laid down which
will cover all cases.24
From a consideration of the cases dealing with this question of
liSilvey v. Lindsay, 107 N. Y. 55 (1887).
16Holmes v. Pino, 31 La. 687, 689 (1912). See also Hall v. Schoenecke, supra,
note 5; Parsons v. The People, 3o Colo. 388 (1902); Sanders v. Getchell, 76
Me. 158 (1884); Matter of Goodman, x46 N. Y. 284 (1895); io Am. &Eng.
Ency. Law (2d ed.), 6o6.17People v. Osborne, 170 Mich. 143 (1912); In re Ward et al, 2o N. Y. Supp. 6o6
(1893); Matter of Garvey, 147 N. Y. 117 (1895).
"People v. Osborne, supra, note 17.
"People v. McCormack, 86 App. Div. (N. Y.) 362 (1903).
20Matter of Barry, supra, note 9.
"Matter of Garvey, supra, note 17.
22Supra, note 16.
"Matter of Garvey, supra, note 17.24McCrary, Elections (4th ed.), sec. iO.
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qualifications of electors it is apparent that the American courts
in general have failed to distinguish between the term residence, as
used in the constitutions, and domicile. The two terms in their
general and technical meanings are not synonymous.2 "That there
is * * * a wide distinction between domicile and residence,
is recognized by the most approved authorities." 26 Domicile in its
technical sense "always signifies a country or territory subject to
one system of laws. "2 "Domicile, therefore, means more than
residence. A man may be a resident of a particular locality without
having his domicile there. He can have but one domicile at one and
the same time * * * although he may have several residences." 2
Residence implies personal presence, but domicile does not, as is
evidenced by the familiar condition of a person non sui juris (for
example, infants or married women) having a domicile in one state
or. country where they do not actually reside. The English courts
recognize the true distinction between the two terms. In Walcott v.
Botfield29 it is pointed out that the question of residence "is entirely
distinct from that of domicile, which is often wholly independent
of actual residence." Thus, an Englishman may be a resident of
France and still retain his domicile in England. But a person could
not be a resident of one of the United States and have his domicile
in another because of the provision in the fourteenth amendment to
the Federal Constitution which declares: "All persons born or
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof are citizens of the United States, and of the state wherein
they reside." Minor, in his Conflict of Laws, says that "This
provision establishes for the states of the Union the rule that A
citizen of one state who abandons that state and goes to another
to reside permanently, thereby ipsofacto loses citizenship in the former
state and acquires it in the latter, regardless of his intentions or
wishes." 0 And he suggests that "owing to this principle, the
American courts are more prone than others to use the terms residence
and citizenship as synonymous with domicile."3' But it is submitted
that this explanation, while apparently logical, is not real, because
some of the cases3 2 declaring residence to be equivalent to domicile
were decided long before the fourteenth amendment was adopted,
and it is referred to in few, if any, of the cases decided since 1866.
"Domkile and residence are not synonymous. The domicile is the home, the
fixed place of habitation; while residence is a transient place of dwelling. Bart-
let v. City of N. Y., 5 Sandf. (N. Y.) 44 (1851); Black's Law Diet., Domicile;
and in New York v. Genet, 4 Hun (N. Y.) 487, 489 (1875) it is said: "The
domicile is the habitation fixed in any place with the intention of always
staying there, while simple residence is much more temporary in its character."26Long v. Ryan, 3o Gratt. (Va.) 718 (1878); Mitchel v. U. S., 21 Wall. (U. S.)350 (1874).27Story, Conflict of Laws (8th ed.), sec. 41.28Long v. Ryan, supra, note 26. See also Westlake, Priv. Int. Law, p. 261.2
1Kay, 534, 543 (854); see also Bell v. Kennedy (1868) L. R., I H. L. Sc. 307,
320.30At p. 60. 3INote, p. 61.
'
20pinion of the Justices, supra, note 9; State v. Daniels, supra, note 4;
Dougherty v. Snyder, 15 S. & R. (Pa.) 84 (1826).
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Perhaps the only explanation of such construction of residence is
that it met the exigpncies of the situation and protected the local
polls from an invasion of voters who were thought to be unconcerned
in local affairs. This whole subject of residence and domicile is
confused and difficult' and it is enough to add that the courts are
now recognizing that there is a broad "distinction between domicile
in a legal and technical sense by which one's civil status and the
rights of persons andproperty are determined, andresidencerequiredby
the constitution as a qualification for the exercise of political rights."M
It may not be out of place to point out the discrimination against
students in the constitutional provisions, which, to a student at least,
seems to be unfair and uncalled for, especially as regards all elections
not purely local in character. A Methodist minister who goes to a
parish for a period of two years with the knowledge that he will be
transferred at the end of that time is allowed to vote in the parish.3 5
The same person would not have that privilege if he entered a semi-
nary for a six year period. A day laborer twenty-one years of age
who goes on a construction job which may. or may not be permanent
becomes an elector at the place of his work." Surely he is no better
qualified, nor has any greater interest in public affairs, than he would
be if he had entered a university instead. Conditions are different
today from those existing in 1846 when the provision was adopted in
the New York constitution. Then the college coursewasfrom three to
four years; now with the increasing requirements of the professional
courses, it is from four to eight years. Also it is not flattering, to
say the least, for students to be put in the same general group with
inmates of alms-houses and prisons, as is done in these constitutional
provisions.3 But because of the difficulty and impracticability
of allowing students to vote in national elections and preventing
them from so doing in municipal ones, the remedy must be sought
in another direction. One which immediately suggests itself, if it
be assumed that it is not desirable that students vote in the college
town, is for the various states to allow them to vote while away
at school as absentee electors. This could be done by enlarging
the provision in the New York 38 and other constitutions39 which
permit "absent electors in actual military service" to vote by
mail. The application of this provision was very well illustrated
in the last election when the men at the Mexican border voted by
mail. A tendency towards extending this principle is seen by one
of the amendments of the New York constitution proposed by
the 1915 convention, which provided for registration of certain
absent electors. 40  O. R. Clark, 'x8.
lnThorndikev. City of Boston, i Mete. (Mass.) 242 (1840), Shaw, Ch. J., says:
"The qit stions of residence, inhabitancy ordomicile * * * are attended with
more difficulty than almost any other which are presented for adjudication."
"Shaeffer v. Gilbert, supra, note 9.
"Cessna v. Myers, Smith 6o, as cited in McCrary, supra, note 24.
"Putnam v. Johnson, supra, note 9. 3'Supra, note 14. 38Art. II, see. 1.
"
9Mich., Art. III, see. I; N. J., Art. II, sec. I; R. I., Amend. IV; S. D., Art. VI,
sec. i9; Utah, Art. I, sec. 37.
'Art. II, sec. 4, 1915 proposed constitution.
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Evidence: Opinions as to Age.-In State v. Koettgen, 99 At.
(N. J.) 400 (9x6), the defendant was indicted for maintaining a
disorderly house, under a statute making the habitual sale of intoxicat-
ing liquors in a house to minors such an offense. To support this
indictment the state produced witnesses who gave their opinions
as to the ages of persons frequenting the house, such testimony being
based solely upon their appearance. This evidence was not objected
to at the time it was introduced, but subsequently the defendant's
attorney moved to strike it out. The court denied the motion,
and rendered judgment on a verdict returned against the defendant.
On appeal, the Supreme Court held it was error to admit this evidence,
because it consisted of opinions only and, since age was a fact capable
of direct proof, it did not come within the category of things provable
by opinion testimony. The court, however, affirmed the judgment
of the lower court on the ground that the objection to the testimony
came too late. White, J., concurred in the result reached by the
court, but adopted the opinion of the lower court, holding that the
opinion evidence was admissible.
Although dictum, the language of the court in regard to the admis-
sibility of opinion evidence as to age presents two interesting
problems, viz., is such evidence admissible when based solely upon
appearances, and is it, when standing alone, sufficient to support a
conviction?
The general rule in regard to testimony by witnesses is that it
must be confined to facts.' However, there are well recognized
exceptions. Upon all questions of science and skill, persons specially
instructed in the particular act or science to which the question
relates may give their opinions.2 Another exception admits the
evidence of common observers, testifying to the results of their
observations in regard to common appearances or facts, and a condi-
tion of things which cannot be reproduced and made palpable to the
jury.3 Under this rule it has been held that a man may give his
opinion as to another's imbecility,4 or intoxication.5 So, also,
there are cases holding that it is not error to admit opinion testimony
as to the age of a person, when such testimony is founded on the
appearance of that person as observed by the witness. 6 In the case
of Poulter v. Stat the defendant was charged with perjury for
having falsely represented his age, and in order to determine the real
'Perry v. Graham, I8 Ala. 822 (I85I)- Larganv. Central R. R. Co., 40 Cal. 272
(1870); Morse v. State, 6 Conn. 9 (1825); Musick v. Latrobe, 184 Pa. St. 375
(1898).
2Staples v. Steed, 167 Ala. 241 (1910); Hammond v. Woodman, 41 Me. 177
(1856).
3Commonwealth v. Sturtivant, 117 Mass. 122 (1875).4DeWitt v. Barly, 17 N. Y. 340 (1858).
$People v. Eastwood, 14 N. Y. 562 (1856); People v. Gaynor, 33 App. Div.(N. Y.) 98 (r898).
6Winter v. State, 123 Ala. i (1898); Porter v. Poquonnoc Mfg. Co., 17 Conn.
249 (1845); State v. Douglass, 48 Mo. App. 39 (1892); Peoplev. Bond, 13 Cal.
App. 175 (1910); Jones v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. Rep. io8 (z893); Garner v. State,
28 Tex. Ct. App. 561 (189o).
270 Tex. Cr. Rep. 197 (1913).
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age of the accused, testimony by witnesses as to their opinion of his
age was held to be admissible. It must be noted in the Poulter case
that the opinion was not founded upon appearance alone, but also
upon acquaintance with the accused. This fact, however, would
seem to affect the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility.
In other cases8 where the age of the defendant was a material
issue, the court held opinion evidence to be admissible when the
witness was first allowed to describe the appearance of the person
and then to give his opinion as to the age of that person. And in all
cases, in order to render opinion evidence admissible, it must not
only be relevant and necessary, 9 but it must appear that the observer
has had sufficient opportunity for drawing the inference which he
states, and the capacity necessary to make it.'1
In view of the cases mentioned above and on principle it would
seem that opinion evidence as to a person's age based solely upon
appearances ought to be admitted as competent evidence, and that,
therefore, the dictum in the principal case was wrong. Wigmore"
thinks that such evidence ought to be received in every case, and
that "any other rule would be pedantically overcautious". Age
is beyond a doubt approximately indicated by the appearances of a
person, and it is only in extreme cases, where the age is very close to
the border line, that the defendant would be prejudiced by having
age estimated from appearances. The better rule, it would seem,
would be to admit the evidence, and then allow the jury to give it
such weight as it may be entitled to.
In respect to the second query, viz., as to whether the opinion
testimony standing alone is sufficient to warrant a conviction, the
answer is more difficult and the authorities scarce. The rule that
the defendant must be proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt2 has
been construed to mean that the guilt of the accused does not have
tobeproved to a mathematical certainty," as otherwise circumstantial
evidence would never convict. In Comnmonwealth v. O'Brien,14 the
defendant was indicted for selling intoxicating liquors to a minor.
The only evidence on the question as to whether or not the girl was
a minor was a description of her appearance by a witness, and a
statement of his opinion that she was not over thirteen years old.
Nevertheless, a verdict of guilty was rendered against the defendant,
and on appeal the verdict was affirmed. This would seem to indicate
8State v. Douglass, supra, note 6; Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 134 Mass. 198(1883).
9Hames v. Brounlee, 63 Ala. 277 (1879); Robertson v. Stark, 1s N. H. xo9(I844).
"McDonald v. Wood, i18Ala. 589 (1897); Manufacturers'Accident Indenity
Co. v. Dorgan, 58 Fed. 945 (1893); McMahon v. City of Dubuque, 107 Iowa 62(1898); May v. Bradlee, 127 Mass. 414 (1879); Nelson v. Boston & Maine
Railroad, 155 Mass. 356 (1892).
nWigmore, Evidence (ist ed.), see. 222.Uflennett v. State, 86 Ga. 401 (189o).
"Winter v. State, supra, note 6; Carlton v. People, i5o Ill. 181 (1894);
State v. Gleim, I7 Mont. 17 (1895); Commonwealth v. Webster, 5 Cush. (Mass.)
295 (I85o), at page 320.
"Supra, note 8.
THE CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
that opinion evidence as to age, standing alone, is sufficient to support
a conviction, as the mere fact that the witness described the minor
prior to giving his opinion should not be considered as materially
increasing the weight of such testimony, as the opinion in any case is
founded upon the appearances as observed by the witness. If the
opinion fixed the age very near the statutory age, it might be held
that all reasonable men should entertain a doubt, and that a convic-
tion could not be sustained.
W. J. Gilleran, 'x8.
Libel and Slander: Construction to be Placed upon Alleged Libelous
Remarks.-In King v. Pillsbury, 99 Atl. (Me.) 513 (W17T), the defend-
ant wrote a letter to the father of the young woman to whom the
plaintiff was paying attention. The letter contained this statement:
"Did you know that Albert King is a damaged goods chap? I
write this for your daughter's sake." At the trial extrinsic evidence
was introduced to show that the words were in substance an allegation
that the plaintiff was afflicted with syphilis. The trial court; further-
more, charged the jury that as a matter of law the words in question
were susceptible of that construction and that it was a question of
fact for the jury to decide whether such interpretation was actually
put upon them. On appeal this charge of the court was held to be
correct and a verdict for the plaintiff was affirmed.
The rule to be applied to the construction of words which admit of
two interpretations, one innocent and one defamatory, is well settled.
The rule is that the words are held to be defamatory, if they are
reasonably susceptible of that interpretation and if they were actually
given that meaning by the person who heard them or read them in the
particular case.' Words are to be taken in their natural meaning
and according to common acceptation. The meaning which the user
of the words intended to convey is immaterial where malice is not in
issue..2
In most respects the courts agree also as to the method by which
the above rule should be applied and the decision reached in each
particular case as to whether the words used are innocent or defama-
tory. When the alleged libel is clear and unambiguous, the question
of its actionability and whether the words are reasonably susceptible
of the meaning attributed to them by the innuendoes is for the court.3
When the alleged libel is ambiguous and fairly capable of two mean-
'Tuttle v. Bishop, 30 Conn. 80 (i86i); Miller v. Johnson, 79 Ill. 58 (1875);
Chaddock v. Briggs, 13 Mass. 248 (1816); Fallenstein v. Booth, 13 Mo. 427
(185o); Carroll v. White, 33 Barb. (N. Y.) 615 (1861); Hamilton v. Smith 19
N. C. 274 (1837); Pandow v. Eichsted, 90 Wisc. 298 (1895); Larsen v. Brooklyn
Daily Eagle, 165 App. Div. (N. Y.) 4 (1914); Willfred Coal Co. v. Sapp, 493 Ill.
App. 400 (1915); Leudh v. Berger, 161 Wisc. 564 (1915).
2Sternau v. Marx, 58 Ala. 608 (1877); Jacksonville Jour. Co. v. Beymer, 42
Ill. App. 443 (189 i ); Arnott v. Standard Asso., 57 Conn. 86 (1888); Triggs v. Sun
Printing & Pub. Co., 179 N. Y. r44 (1904); Goebler v. Wilhelm, 17 Pa. Super:
Ct. 432 (-1901); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pritchett, "io8 Ga. 4 n (1899).
'Williams v. McKee, 98 Tenn. 139 (x897); Dowie v. Priddle, 216 Ill. 553 (1904);
Gerald v. Inter-Ocean Pub. Co., 90 11. App. 205 (19oo); Kilgour v. Evening
Star Co., 96 Md. 16 (19o2); Shanks v. Stumpf, 23 Misc. (N. Y.) 264.
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ings, one defamatory and the other harmless, and no extrinsic
evidence is introduced, the question as to the meaning of the words
and the sense in which they were understood is for the jury.4
The case of King v. Pillsbury, however, illustrates a situation in
which the province of court and jury is not fully determined. Here
we have an action for libel where the meaning of the expression depends
on extrinsic evidence and the court held that the question whether
it is capable of the meaning imputed to it is for the court to decide;
whether it actually had such meaning to the reader in connection
with the context and the surrounding circumstances is for the jury.
Quinn v. Prudential Life Ins. Co.,5 however, holds that "where any
doubt exists as to the meaning of a publication, so that extrinsic
evidence is needed to determine whether it is actionable, it is then a
question for the jury, under proper instructions from the court."
In other words, according to this latter case the whole matter is one
for the jury. In this contention the Quinn case is sustained by two
Michigan cases and an Indiana case.8
The weight of authority is with King v. Pillsbury.7 The view of
the matter taken by the great majority of the courts is pointed out in
Richardson v. Thorpe." "If the words are capable of being used in
the sense charged in the innuendo the question whether or not they
were so used is for the jury; for notwithstanding whether they are
capable of that construction is a question of law, whether that was
the sense in which they were used was for the jury as a question of
fact." It is quite clear that as a general rule in this country where
the language of the alleged libel or slander is ambiguous and capable
of two meanings, one defamatory and one innocent, the whole matter
will be left to the jury, unless extrinsic evidence is introduced to
show that one or the other meaning should be taken, in which case
the court will determine whether such interpretation would be a
reasonable one under the circumstances. This appears to be the
rule in New York also.9
The rule that alleged libelous and slanderous words should be
given a reasonable construction and meaning, in accordance with the
generally accepted significance of the words under the particular
circumstances of each case, has an interesting history. The first
4Hanchett v. Chiatovitch, ioi Fed. Rep. 742 (900); Waugh v. Waugh, 47
Ind. 580 (1874); Sheftall v. Central R. R. of Ga., 123 Ga. 589 (19o5); Alcorn v.
Bass, 17 Ind. App. Soo (1897); Jensen v. Damm, 127 Iowa 555 (905); Kaw v.
N. Y. Press Co. 137 App. Div. 686 (igio); Hoey v. N. Y. Times Co., 138 App.
Div. (N. Y.) 149 (1910).
5ii6 (Iowa) 522 (1904).
'Bourreseau v. Detroit Even. Jour., 63"Mich.425 (1886); Orband v. Kalamazoo
Tel. Co., 170 Mich. 387 (1912); Mosier v. Stoll, ui9 nd. 245 (1889).2Thompson v. The Sun Pub. Co., 91 Me. 203 (1898); Smart v. Blanchard, 42 N.
H. 137, 149 (1860); Clarkson v. The Book Supply Co., 170 IU. App. 86 (1912);Crane v. Dowling, 71 Vt. 295 (1899); Tiepkev. The Times Pub. Co., 20 R. I. 200(1897); Diener v. Star-Chronicle Pub. Co., 232 Mo. 416 (1911); Warner v. Baker,
36 App. D. C. 493 (1911); Thormanv. Bryngelson, 87 Neb. 53 (19IO).C N. H . 532
'Cooper v. Rochester Ice Cream Co., 212 N. Y. 341 (1914); Barringer v. Sun
Prin. & Pub. Ass., 16o App. Div. (N. Y.) 691 (1914).
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rule we have on the subject was that of mitiori sensu, i.e., that, where
an innocent meaning could possibly by any gymnastics of reasoning
be put upon the words, that innocent meaning should be the proper
one to attach to them.'0
Here are a few examples of the rule of mitiori sensu: "Bear
witness, mistress, that he hath stolen my hair cloth."" This was
held not actionable, for there was no direct affimation of stealing.
"Thou art a lewd fellow; thou didst set upon me by the highway,
and take my purse from me; and I will be sworntoit."'2  Held, not
actionable, for there is no charge of robbery or felony, for the defend-
ant might have taken the purse in jest or for some other cause.
"You have committed burglary in breaking his house and stealing his
goods."' 3 Held, not actionable, for breaking a house may be a
trespass and not a felony.
The rule of mitiori sensu broke down during the latter part of
the seventeenth century and the tendency of the courts then was to
interpret alleged libellous language in malam partem. This is illus-
trated by the remarks of Lord Holt in the case of Baker v. Pierce.4
"Where words tend to slander a man and take away his reputation,
we should be for supporting actions upon them for it tends to preserve
the peace." Out of this conflict of theory has come the present rule
of reasonable interpretation. The reason for this change is best
summed up by the court in Bloss v. Tobey.'6 "Judicial opinions
as to the manner of construing alleged libelous words have varied at
different times. At one time before the period of Lord Holt words
were to be taken in mitiori sensu, afterwards in malam partem where
the sense would bear it. This, it was said, was because men were
litigious in the first period and the court thought proper to discourage
actions for slander and in the second because men's tongues were
ill governed and it was proper and necessaryto restrain them. * * *
Out of the conflicting opinions of the two periods, before spoken of,
during one of which the decisions took their cast from the desire of
discouraging, and during the other of encouraging such suits, has
grown the modern practice, which being more just and reasonable,
it is to be hoped will be more stable, viz., that words alleged to be
defamatory shall be taken in their natural sense and meaning and
shall not be distorted to support any particular system."
Harry H. Hoffnagle, '19.
Parent and Child: Liability of a Father for Expense of an Operation
on a Child Living Away from Homne.-If a minor child lives away
from home with its parents' consent and supports itself, upon what
theory, if any, may the parents be charged for necessaries furnished
10Odgers, Libel and Slander, p. rix.
"Burry v. Wright, Yelverton 126 (16o9).
"2Holland v. Stoner, Cro. Jac. 315 (1613).
"3Brown v. St. John, 2 Cro. Eliz. 889 (1602); Peake v. Pollard, i Cro. Eliz. 214(i59i). See also Cox v. Humphrey, 2 Cro. Eliz. 889 (162); Latham v. Hum-
phrey, 2 Oro. Eliz. 890 (1602).
142 Ld. Rayd. 959 (1704).
"mig Mass. 320, 327 (1824).
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the child by a third person? In Wallace v. Cox, Z88 S. W. (Tenn.)
6xi (1916), the parents moved out of town; their two daughters
remained, residing at the Y. W. C. A. and earning their own living.
One of the daughters was taken sick, and in a telephone conversation
the father gave consent to the other daughter to have a minor
operation performed, he not believing that an incision was necessary
nor knowing the name of the plaintiff surgeon. The father's consent
was not communicated to the surgeon until after he had performed
a serious operation, an incision being necessary. The surgeon
testified that he looked to the defendant parent for his pay. The
Tennessee court held that there was no emancipation sufficient to
relieve the parent, and that the law implied a promise on his part to
pay for the operation.
As to the nature of the emancipation of a child by which a parent
is freed from liability for necessaries furnished the child, there are
conflicting views. In Porter v. Powell,' similar on its facts to the
principal case, the court defined emancipation to include four separate
elements, namely, (i) care, (2) custody, (3) control and (4) service.
Freedom from all of these would be a general emancipation, but free-
dom from only a part of these parental rights would be a limited
emancipation. A parent having these several rights may waive
one without waiving another. Freedom from service does not waive
the right to care, custody and control, so far as the same can be
exercised consistently with the right waived. The Iowa court
said:2 "The obligation of parents to support their minor children
does not arise alone out of the duty of the child to serve. If so, those
who are unable to render service because of infancy, sickness, or
accident-who, most of all others, need support-would not be
entitled to it." Similarly, it has been held recently in Minnesota3
that a father is liable on an implied promise for an operation on an
infant son who is working, receiving and spending his own wages and
paying his board at home. The reason given is that complete
emancipation cannot be inferred from the fact that the parents
assented that their infant son should hire out and collect and spend
what he earns. That a minor child should leave home for temporary
employment, even though he might receive the proceeds for his own
use, is not so uncommon an occurrence as to authorize an inference of
any change in the ties that bind parent and child.4 The test to be
applied to determine whether there has or has not been emancipation
to relieve a parent from liability for necessaries furnished his child
is that of the preservation or destruction of the parental and filial
relations' In an early Connecticut case6 the court said:7 "what-
ever might be the effect of such an agreement, as between the son
179 Ia. 151 (i8go). See also Cooperv. McNamara, 92-Ia. 243 (1894); Dunks v.
Grey, 3 Fed. 862 (i88o); Kubic v. Zemke, io5 Ia. 269 (x898).
279 Iowa 15i, 157.
3Lufken v. Harvey, 13i Minn. 238 (1915).
4Searsmont v. Thorndike, 77 Me. 504 (885).
gLowell v. Newport, 66 Me. 78 (1876).
6Torrington v. Norwich, 21 Conn. 542 (1852).
'At page 548.
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on the one part, and the parent, or other person, on the other, respect-
ing the personal right of the son to retain or recover his earnings, in
his own name, -and for his own benefit, it does not release a child
from the authority and control of the parent, nor the parent from the
duty of maintaining and protecting the child. It neither destroys
nor impairs the previous subordinate relation which the child sus-
tained -towards the parent, as a member of the family". Where a
parent consents that a minor child may support itself, still, according
to these views, for necessaries furnished the child the parent may
be bound on a promise implied by law.8
There are, however, contrary views. Of course, in those juris-
dictions holding broadly that there is no common law duty on a
parent to support a child, the parent would not in any event be
liable on a promise implied by law for necessaries furnished the child
by third persons.9 , In a Missouri case,10 a minor son was given the
right to his own earnings and the parent allowed him to leave home.
He went to Oregon to work for himself. There he was taken ill.
He told his doctor that he thought he could get money from his
father to pay the doctor's fee. The father later wrote to the hospital,
asking that the son be given attention and that he would send money.
In an action against the father for the doctor's services, however,
the court held that the father was only morally but not legally bound
to pay the doctor for services rendered the son. The court said"
that "where the child who is physically and mentally able to
take care of himself, has voluntarily abandoned the parental roof
and turned his back to its protection and influence, and has gone
out to fight the battle of life on his own account, the parent is under
no obligation to support him." Where a minor daughter, living
away from home with consent and supporting herself, purchased
necessaries, without which she had not enough to make herself
comfortable, an Illinois court held12 that the parent had a technical
defense to an action for the goods sold the daughter; an express
promise, or circumstances from which a promise may be inferred,
would have to be proved before the parent was liable. In a recent
North Carolina case13 an eighteen year old son was permitted to
leave home to work for himself and receive and spend the earnings
of his own-labor. Upon such a state of facts the father was held to
have released his parental control and was not liable for the care
and maintenance of his child. It has been held that where an infant
is only a few miles from home and is not in imminent peril,14 or there
is no emergency, 15 the father is not liable for necessaries furnished the
infant. In an early New York case"8 a father consented to his son's
8DeWane v. Hansow, 56 Il. App. 575 (1894).9Kelly v. Davis, 49 N. H. I87 (1870); Gordon v. Potter, 17 Vt. 348 (1845).
1Brosius v. Barker, 154 Mo. App. 657 (19II).
"
1At page 663.
12Gotts v. Clark, 78 Il1. 229 (1875).
*"Holland v. Hartley, 171 N. C. 376 (1916).
'
4Sassaman v. Wells, 178 Mich. 167 (1913).
"Cooper v. McNamara, supra, note i; Luikin v. Harvey, supra, note 3.
15johnson v. Gibson, 4 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 231 (1855).
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going to California and paid his fare, but the son received his own
earnings and supported himself while away. The father was held
not liable for necessary medical attention furnished the son during
an illness. This case has been approved in an Appellate Division
case where a minor sued for injuries received in the employ of the
defendant company. The court held"7 that the plaintiff, although a
minor, was receiving his own wages and paying his own expenses,
so that there was an emancipation by his parents, and he could
recover damages on account of money expended for medical attend-
ance and hospital charges, for they were his liabilities. In this latter
group of cases, therefore, are shown circumstances under which there
is no legal liability on a parent for necessaries furnished a child who
is self-supporting.
From a consideration of the cases it would seem that the following
facts might well be considered in determining whether a father can
be held on an implied promise for necessaries furnished a partially
emancipated child: (i) the nature of the emancipation (i.e., has
there been freedom from services only, and not from care, custody
and control?); (2) the exigencies of the situation in which the child-
has been placed (sickness is the typical case); (3) the distance the
child is from the parent; (4) the sex and age of the child; and (5) the
child's earning power. The Minnesota court grasped the situation
when it said:18 "We think a gift to the son of his wages has about
the same bearing upon the liability of the parent for necessaries
that a gift of any other money would have." As stated in the
principal case, the modem tendency among young men and women,
not yet of fll age, to earn a living frequently gives occasion for
absence from home, and that fact should not readily be held to
deprive them of a claim to support in time of need.
H. R. Lamb, '8.
Quasi-contract: Recovery by a Putative Wife for Services.-On
September 20, 1913, W. W. Hinshaw attempted to unite in the
bonds of matrimony with Mrs. K. 0. Sanders although he already had
a lawful wife. The second" Mrs. Hinshaw" occupied herself with the
usual duties of a housewife until Hinshaw's death in 1915. At that
time, she first learned of the existence of the other Mrs. Hinshaw.
Upon discovering the true state of affairs, she sued Hinshaw's estate
to recover compensation for the services she had rendered him, and
also to recover the two hundred dollars she had presented to him to,
build a home. In Sanders v. Ragan, go S. E. (S. C.) 777 (x9i6),
the court held she might recover though the benefits were conferred
without expectation of remuneration.
The action in a case such as this may be brought either upon the
theory of deceit or of quasi-contract. It is unquestioiable that
"Mrs. Hinshaw" had a good cause of action against Hinshaw in
deceit before his death.' Did this cause of action survive as an
17 Giovagnioli v. Fort Orange Const. Co., 148 App. Div. (N. Y.) 489.
181n Lufkin v; Harvey, supra, note (3), at page 242.
'Seas v. Wegner, i~o Mich. 388 (1907); Blossom v. Barrett, 37 N. Y. 434
(1868); Morrill v. Palmer, 68 Vt. 1 (1895).
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action ex deliclo which had enriched Hinshaw's estate? Some courts
have held that such an action is purely personal, the deceit being the
concealment of the incapacity to contract a valid marriage and the
resulting damage being the entrance into the supposed marital state;
that the essential injury lies in the degradation of the woman and in
the mortification and humiliation she undergoes; that this injury is
purely personal and the tort action for it does not survive the death
of the defendant; and that the fact that she has conferred material
benefits upon him in her supposed capacity as wife is merely an
indirect and incidental result of the tort, and it is not sufficient to
make the cause of action survive.2 However, it should be noticed
that there are two elements of fraud in the case. There is, first,
deceit as to the existence of a barrier to matrimony. This deceit
is the means of inducing the plaintiff to enter the supposed state of
matrimony. Thereafter, whether by words or by acts, the husband
is continually and fraudulently representing that the marriage is
valid, that the marital status exists. It is this second fraud that may
properly be regarded as the-direct inducement to the conferring of
benefits. The courts which hold that these benefits are not the direct
results of fraud have evidently overlooked this latter element of
deceit. That they have done so is indicated by the attempt in
Payne's Appeal3 to suggest an analogy between a woman falsely
representing herself to be capable of contracting marriage and a
woman representing herself to be white, though she were in reality a
half-breed. It is very obvious that in the latter case the fraud
would be consummated upon marriage, since the marriage would then
be valid, though induced by fraud. But in the former case, the
marriage is never valid, and the continuous representation that it is
good is a continued fraud.4 In such a case benefits conferred in
reliance upon the existence of the marital status are a direct enrich-
ment of the wrongdoer's estate, and the action for them should
survive his death.
The action under the circumstances of the principal case may be
on the theory of quasi-contract. Quasi-contractual recovery is
based upon the unjust enrichment of the defendant at the expense of
the plaintiff, and therefore the action survives against the defendant's
estate. Hinshaw's estate was unquestionably enriched because of
the saving of expense through the services rendered by his victim
and because of the money she donated. Was such enrichment
unjust? Plainly it was induced by Hinshaw's fraud. When one is
induced to act in a certain status, whether by the fraud or constraint
of another, one may recover for benefits so conferred upon the other,
if the status does not in fact exist. When a negro is induced by
fraud to believe he is a slave5 or is compelled by force to act in that
2 Payne's Appeal, 65 Conn. 397 (1895); Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass. 370(1888); Pricey. Price, 75 N. Y. 244 (1878); Grimv. Carr, 31 Pa. St. 533 (1858).3Supra, note 2. 4Morrill v. Palmer, supra, note i.5
-ickam v. Hickam, 46 Mo. App. 496 (i89i). Distinguish Franklin v. Waters,
8 Gill (Md.) 322 (1849). In that case recovery was denied because the action
was in its essence intended to try plaintiff's freedom, and another form was
prescribed for such actions.
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capacity,' he may recover for the services rendered, although he
could not recover had both he and his master honestly believed him
to be a slave.7 A man condemned to hard labor under a void judg-
ment may recover the value of his services from the lessee of the
prison.8  When a guardian induces his ward to believe she is a
member of his household, although in reality he is charging her
estate with her expenses, she may recover the value of her household
services.9 When one induces a railroad to transport goods under
the impression it has contracted to do so, it may recover for the
service.10 The majority of cases in which one has been induced by
fraud to confer benefits under a supposed marital status follow this
rule." Cooper v. Cooper5 is the leading case against recovery under
such circumstances. In that case the action was in quasi- contract to
recover for services. But it is to be remarked that a later Massa-
chusetts case allows recovery for moneys paid under a fraudulently
induced belief in a marital status upon the theory that an equitable
trust was created. It is submitted that any distinction between
services rendered and money had and received is not justifiable. In
either case the defendant has knowingly induced the plaintiff to
confer upon him benefits to which he was not entitled. The better
rule would allow recovery.14
L. I. Shelley, '.7.
Real Property: Easements by Necessity.-The case of Gilfoy v.
Ratdall, 113 N. E. (Ill.) 88 (1916), shows that Illinois has come in
line with the prevailing view with regard to the implied grant of a
right of way when the land of the grantee is entirely surrounded by
6Peter v. Steel, 3 Yeates (Pa.) 250 (I8O1).
7Livingston v. Ackeston, 5 Cowen (N. Y.) 530 (1826); Griffin v. Potter, 14
Wend. (N. Y.) 209 (1835); Urie v. Johnston, 3 P. & W. (Pa.) 212 (1831). Dis-
tinguish the following slave cases: Alfred v. Marquis of Fit, Jame, 3 Esp.(Eng.) 3 (1799), in which a negro brought from Martinique to England was not
allowed to recover for services while in England in the absence of express contract.
It does not appear he was ignorant of the fact that he was free on reaching Eng-
land; the services may have been entirely gratuitous: Kinney v. Cook, 4 Iii.
232 (1841); recovery for services was allowed here, but the discussion was entirely
confined to the question of plaintiff's freedom; the action was apparently brought
tO try his freedom: Jarrot v. Jarrot, 7 11!. (2 Gillman) i (1845); recovery for
services was allowed, hut to be nominal if the master held him in good faith.
'Patterson v. Crawford, Ia Ind. 241 (1859) ; Patterson v. Prior, i8 Ind. 440
(1862).
'Boardman v. Ward, 40 Minn. 399 (1889).1 0 Rtmsey v. N. E. Ry. Co., I4 C. B. (n. s.) (Eng.) 64! (1863). The holder of
an excursion ticket which did not entitle him to the transportation of baggage
represented himself to hold an ordinary ticket.
nIlasser v. Wallis, 1 Salk. (Eng.) 28; Fox v. Dawson, 8 Mart. (0. S. La.) 94
(1820); Batty v. Gxreene, 206 Mass. 561 (191o); Hliggins v. Breen, 9 Mo. 497
(1845). Contra, Payne's Appeal, supra, note 2; Cooper v. Cooper, supra, note 2.JSupme, note 2.3Batty v. Greene, supra, note Ir.
"Fraud is of course a necessary element of recovery. If both parties actedinnocently, no recovery can be had though the watus did not exist. Jarrot v.
Jarrot, supra, note 7; Livingston v. Ackeston, spr, note 7; Griffin v. Porter,
supra, note 7; Cropsey v. Sweeney, 27 Barb. (N. Y.) 3 _ (I838); Uriev. Johnston,
supna, note 7.
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that of the grantor and other private owners. In this case the
defendant had no access to any road except over the land of the
grantor or over the land of others. It was held that a way of neces-
sity over the land of grantor existed here, as well as in cases where
the land of the grantee is totally surrounded by the land of the
grantor.
This case is in accord with the prevailing view.' The early view
in Illinois and in Maine was to the contrary. The Illinois case of
Kuhlman v. Hecht2 held that if a party sells land not entirely str-
rounded by his own, but only adjoining the same, the purchaser
acquires no right of way over the remaining land of the grantor,
even though it lies between the land bought and the public highway.
Gilfoy v. Randall overrules this earlier case. Apparently the only
American case in accord with Kuhlman v. Hecht is Trask v. Patterson,z
an early Maine case, which is now overruled. 4
Originally the theory seems to have been that it was for the public
good that there be an easement over the land of the grantor to a
landlocked tenement.5 The view now is that the necessity does
not create the way, but merely furnishes evidence as to the real
intention of the parties.6 It is not to be presumed that one will
convey land to another in such a manner that the grantee can derive
no benefit from the conveyance.7  It is evident that if the grantee
had no right of way to his land, he could not enjoy it. Therefore, the
law presumes that it was the intention of the parties that the grantee
should have access to his property over the land of the grantor.8
There is no doubt that the theory applies where the grantee's
land is wholly surrounded by the land of the grantor.9 The only
question is whether a distinction should be made between this case
and the case where the grantee's land is surrounded partly by the
land of the grantor and partly by the land of others. It might be
'Taylor v. Warnaky, 55 Cal. 350 (1880); Collins v. Prentice, 15 Conn. 39(1842); Fairchild v. Stewart, 117 Iowa 734 (1902); Mead v. Anderson, 40 Kari.
203 (1888); Roland v. O'Neal, 122 S. W. (Ky.) 827 (9o9); Whitehouse v.
Cummings, 83 Me. 91 (189o); Zimmerman v. Cockey, i18 Md. 491 (1912);
Bass v. Edwards, 126 Mass. 445 (1879); Moore v. White, 159 Mich. 46o (igog);
Kimball v. Cochecho R. R., 27 N. H. 448 (1853); Higbee Fishing Club v. Atlantic
City Electric Co., 78 N. J. Eq. 434, (91H); Palmer v. Palmer, 159 N. Y. 139
(1896); Sweezy v. Vallette, 37 R. I. 51 (1914); Brown v. Berry, 6 Cold. (Tenn.)
98 (1868); Proudfoot v. Saffle, 62 W. Va. 51 (1907).
277 Ill. 570 (1875).
329 Me. 499 (1849).4Whitehouse v. Cummings, supra, note i.$Dutton v. Taylor, 2 Lutw. (Eng.) 1487, (170) referred to in Wheeldon v.
Burrows, 12 Ch. D. (Eng.) at 581 (1879).6Sweezy v. Vallette, Fairchild v. Stewart, Collins v. Prentice, supra, note I;
Brown v. Kemp, 46 Ore. 517 (1905). In Nichols v. Luce, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 102(1864), the court says: "Necessity is only a circumstance reverted to for the
purpose of showing the intention of the parties, and raising an implication of a
grant. . . . It is not necessity which creates the way, but a fair construction
of the acts of the parties."7Collins v. Prentice, supra, note i; Howton v. Frearson, 8 Term Rep. (Eng.)
50 (1798).
Fairchild v. Stewart, supra, note i.
'Brigham v. Smith, 4 Gray (Mass.) 297 (1855).
NOTES AND COMMENT
claimed that in the latter case, the grantee could contract for a
right of way over the land of the other private owners. But it is
true also that he could contract for a right of way over the land of
the grantor in the first case. The courts evidently regard 4he
situation as it exists at the time of the grant, and in either case it is
obvious that at this time the grantee could not gain access to and
hence use and enjoy his land without trespassing upon the lands of
another. Hence, there is no ground of distinction between the two
cases, and in both a way of necessity over the land of the grantor
should be implied from the grant.
Charles V. Parsell, Jr., 'z7.
Real Property: Tenancy by the Entireties: Status in the United
States.-The case of the Matter of Village of Holcomb, 97 Misc.
(N. Y.) 241 (zp96), holds that both husband and wife in a tenancy by
the entireties are "freeholders" under a statute requiring the consent
of a certain number of freeholders for the incorporation of a village.
Recent decisions are constantly calling to the attention of the profes-
sion the conflict between the common law theory of tenancy by the
entireties and the independent situation of women under the Married
Women's Acts.' Because of this conflict, it may be of interest to
collect the authorities which show the status of the estate by the
entireties in the various American jurisdictions and in England.2
Frederic M. Hoskins, 'x9.
1See, for example, Wright v. KnaIpp, 15o N. W. (Mich.) 315 (1915); Demerse v.
Mitchell, 154N. W. (Mich.) 22 (1915); Matter of Katzl, 216 N.Y. 83 (1915);
Matter of Goodrich v. Otego, 216 N. Y. 112 (i915); Beihl v. Martin, 236 Pa. 59
(1912).
2England. Estates by the entireties were abolished by the Married Women's
Acts, and husband and wife now take as joint tenants or as tenants in common.
Thornley v. Thornley, 1893 L. R. 2 Ch. Div. 229.
Alabama. Inasmuch as the Married Women's Acts have destroyed the
common law unity of husband and wife, estates by the entireties are abolished
and husband and wife take as tenants in common. Donegan v. Donegan, IO3
Ala. 488 (1893).
Arizona. There seems to be no actual decision in point, but secs. 3848, 3850
of the Civil Code provide that land acquired by either spouse or by husband and
wife after marriage, with some exceptions, shall be community property, thereby
providing a substitute for and abolishing entireties.
Arkansas. A conveyance to husband and wife makes them tenants by the
entireties and the survivor takes the whole. The Married Women's Acts did
not modify the estate by entireties. McWhorter v. Green, IIi Ark. I (i914).
California. Husband and wife hold community property in this state and
the common law doctrine of entireties was never in force here. Husband and
wife may hold as joint tenants, tenants in common, or community owners.
Civil Code, sees. 161, 164; Swan v. Walden, 156 Cal. i95 (1909).
Colorado. The common law applies in Colorado where there is no statutory
provision to th& contrary. Mill's Ann. Statutes, sec. 6992. There being no
statutory provision to the contrary, and in the absence of judicial decision, it
would seem that entireties still exist.
Connecticut.-The doctrine of entireties was never adopted in this state, but
the circumstances ordinarily creating such an estate create a joint tenancy. Whit-
tlesey v. Fuller, ii Conn. 337 (1836). But the effect of an estate by the entireties
may be created by a limitation to the husband conditionally on his surviving
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his wife, and to the wife conditionally on her surviving her husband, and to both
for their joint lives. Bartholomew v. Muzzy, 6x Conn. 387 (1892).
Delaware. The estate by entireties exists as at common law and was not
modified or affected by the Married Women's Acts. Kunz v. Kurtz, 8 Del. Ch.
404 (1899).
District of Columbia. Estates by the entireties exist as at a common law and
were not affected by the Married Women's Acts. Flaherty v. Columbus, 41
D. C. App. Cas. 525 (1914).
Florida. Estates by the entireties exist as at common law and were not
affected by the Married Women's Acts. English v. English, 66 Fla. 427 (1913).
Georgia. It would seem that entireties were abolished in Georgia by secs.
3722 and 3723 of the Georgia Code which make all joint tenancies tenancies in
common; but survivorship is allowed the husband in land deeded, jointly to
him and his wife. Scott v. Causey, 89 Ga. 749 (1892).
Idaho. The common law estate by the entireties does not exist; all property
acquired after marriage not within secs. 2676, 2679 of the Rev. Codes is community
property. Kohny v. Dunbar, 21 Idaho 258 (1912).
Illinois. Estates by the entireties were abolished by the Married Women's
Acts, and husband and wife hold as tenants in common, unless it is expressed
that. they are to hold as joint tenants, and even in joint tenancies, survivorship
is abolished. Cooper v. Cooper, 76 Ill. 57 (1875); Lawler v. Byrne, 252 Ill. 194
(1911).
Indiana. An estate by the entireties is created by a conveyance to husband and
wife, unless a contrary intent is expressed. Richards v. Richards, 6o Ind. App. 34(I915).
Iowa. The common law estate by the entireties does not exist, because of a
statute making all joint tenancies tenancies in common. Bader v. Dyer, 1o6
Iowa 715 (1898).
Kansas. Estates by the entireties do not exist under a statute abolishing alljoint tenancies, for entireties are construed as a form of joint tenancy. Stewart v.
Thomas, 64 Kan. 5II (1902).
Kentucky. If, in a conveyance to husband and wife, a survivorship is provided
for, under sec. 2143, Ky. Stat., they take an estate by the entireties. If no
survivorship is provided for, they take as tenants in common. City of Louisville
v. Coleburne, lo8 Ky. 42o (19oo).
Louisiana. Real property which at common law would be held by the entireties
is common or community property in Louisiana. Civil Code, sees. 2334, 2402.
Maine. Husband and wife take only as tenants in common, the Married
Women's Acts having destroyed the common law estate by entireties. Appeal
of Robinson, 88 Me. 17 (1895).
Maryland. The common law estate by the entireties still exists and was not
affected by the Married Women's Acts. Marburg v. Cole, 49 Md. 402 (1878).
Massachusetts. The common law estate by the entireties is created by a
conveyance to husband and wife as such, unless a contrary intention is expressed
in the conveyance. Hoag v. Hoag, 213 Mass. 5o (1912); Woodardv. Woodard,
216 Mass. I (1913).
Michigan. The common law estate by the entireties is createdby a conveyance
to husband and wife, and divorce does not affect the nature of it. Appeal of
Lewis, 85 Mich. 340 (i89I). However, the original rule as to divorce has been
changed by a statute which makes them tenants in common in case of divorce.
Howell's Michigan Statutes, sec. 11497.
Minnesota. Estates by the entireties never existed in this state and husband
and wife take as tenants in common, unless declared to take as joint tenants.
Semper v. Coates, 93 Minn. 76 (19o4).
Mississippi. A conveyance to husband and wife creates a tenancy in common
unless it is declared an "entirety" or "joint tenancy", under Mississippi Code of
19o6, sec. 2770. Conn v. Boutwell, 1O1 Miss. 353 (1911).
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Missouri. Estates by the entireties exist as at common law, unaffected by the
Married Women's Acts. Craig v. Bradley, i53 Mo. App. 586 (i911).
Montana. The estate by entireties would seem to be abolished by a statutory
provision providing that husband and wife or several persons to whom a con-
veyance is made shall hold in common, unless the conveyance is expressly
declared to be to them as partners or joint tenants. Civil Code, secs. 4438,4441.
Nebraska. The common law doctrine of entireties was never in force in this
state, because the unity of husband and wife had been destroyed. They take
as tenants in common or as joint tenants. Kerner v. McDonald, 6o Neb. 663
(I9OO).
Nevada. With some exceptions, lands acquired after marriage by husband and
wife are community property, which, being a substitute for entireties, abolishes it.
Rev. Laws of 1912, sec. 2156.
New Hampshire. A conveyance to husband and wife cieates a tenancy in
common, unless expressly declared to be a joint tenancy, for entireties were
abolished by the Married Women's Acts. Clark v. Clark,'56 N. H. lO5 (1875).
New Jersey. The rights of husband and wife as tenants by the entireties were
modified by the Married Women's Acts, so that the estate now amounts in its
essential features to a tenancy in common for the joint lives of the two, with
remainder to the survivor. Schulz v. Ziegler, 80 N. J. Eq. 199 (1912).
NewMexico. Husband and wife may hold as joint tenants, tenants in common,
or as a community. New Mexico Stats., sees. 2756, 2764. It is generally held
in states having community property that entireties do not exist, for the
community system is a substitute for entireties.
New York. A husband and wife take an estate by the entireties unless the
contrary is expressed; but they are considered as tenants in common regarding
the use and profits of the land for their joint lives. Bertles v. Nunan, 92 N. Y.
152 (1883); Stelz v. Shreck, 128 N. Y. 263 (i891); Hiles v. Fisher, I44N. Y.
3o6 (1895); Price v. Pestka, 54 App. Div. (N. Y.) 59 (i9oo); Matter of Klatzl,
216 N. Y. 83 (1915); Smith v. Russell, 172 App. Div. (N. Y.) 793 (i916).
North Carolina. Tenancy by the entireties exists as at common law. A
divorce changes such an estate into a tenancy in common. McKinnon v. Caulk,
167 N. C. 411 (914).
North Dakota. There are no decisions in point, but sees. 5261 and 5265 of the
Compiled Laws of 1913 limit the estates, held by several persons, to partner-
ships, joint tenancies, and tenancies in common, thereby seeming to exclude
entireties.
Ohio. Survivorship in joint tenancies was abolished by statute, and no excep-
tionwith'respect to joint estates held byhusband and wife exists, so that entireties
are abolished. Wilson v. Fleming, 13 Oh. 68 (1844).
Oklahoma. Estates by the entireties never existed in this state and husband
and wife take as tenants in common, unless stated to take a joint tenancy. Helvie
v. Hoover, ii Okla. 687 (1902); Hamra v. Fitzpatrick, 154 Pac. (Okla.) 665
(I916).
Oregon. Tenancy by the entireties exists as at common law in this state.
Myers v. Reed, 17 Fed. Rep. 40 (1883).
Pennsylvania. A conveyance to husband and wife creates a common law
estate by the entireties, even though a contrary intention be expressed, the
Married Women's Acts not having affected it. Hetzel v. Lincoln, 216 Pa. 6o
(i9o6); Alles v. Lyon, 216 Pa. 604 (1907); Blease v. Anderson, 241 Pa. 198
(1913).
Rhode Island. A conveyance to husband and wife, unless expressly declaring
them to take by joint tenancy or providing for a survivorship, creates a tenancy
in common. General Laws of R. I., Title 26, Chap. 252, see. i.
South Carolina. A conveyance to husband and wife will create a tenancy in
common, unless it is otherwise specified; that is, they will take an estate by the
entireties if a survivorship is provided for. Green v. Cannaday, 77 S. C. i93
(907).
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Sales: Risk of Loss when Vendor Retains Title as Security for Per-
formance by Vendee.-In Rylance v. Walker Company, 99 Atl. (Md.) 597
(z.r6), it was held that the loss fell upon the vendor. The vendee
ordered seventy coils of bolt rope to be shipped to Baltimore. The
vendor had the bill of lading made out to "his order" and sent the
same, properly indorsed by him, with a draft for the price of the rope
attached, with directions to "turn over the bill of lading" to the
buyer upon payment of the draft. The goods were shipped and the
vendee notified of their arrival at Baltimore. The vendee refused
to pay the draft, unless he could deduct therefrom a certain amount
which he claimed to be due him by virtue of a former similar transac-
tion, Because of the delay thus caused, the dock authorities stored
the goods in a United States bonded warehouse, where they were
subsequently destroyed by fire. Neither party had exercised any
acts of ownership over the rope after its arrival at Baltimore.
. The Court of Appeals of Maryland, having regard to section 43
of article 83 of the Maryland Code, which is identical with section 32
of the Uniform Sales Act, providing that "where delivery of the goods
has been made to the buyer, or to a bailee for the buyer, in pursuance
of the contract, and the property in the goods has been retained by
the seller merely to secure performance by the buyer of his obligations
under the contract, the goods are at the buyer's risk from the time
of such delivery," held that the vendor retained both the possession
of, and the property in, the goods, and that there was no evidence
South Dakota. The Civil Code of 1913, sec. ioi, provides substantially that
the husband and wife may hold property as joint tenants or tenants in common,
but makes no mention of entireties. The reasonable construction of this section
in the absence of judicial decision would seem to be that entireties do not exist.
Tennessee. A conveyance to husband and wife cannot create a tenancy in
common, but creates an estate by the entireties, which exists as at common law,
unmodified by the Married Women's Acts. Blennett v. Hutchins, 133 Tenn. 65
(1915).
Texas. Husband and wife hold community property in'this state; and, where
community property is provided for, it is commonly held that entireties do not
exist. Vernon's Sayles' Tex. Civ. Statutes, Art. 4622. Each spouse, in a con-
veyance to the husband and wife, takes an undivided share unless it falls within
the community acts. Bradley v. Love, 60 Tex. 472 (1883).
Vermont. Estates by the entireties exist as at common law. Brownson v.
Hull, 16 Vt. 3o9 (1844); Corinth v. Emery, 63 Vt. 5o5 (1891).
Virginia. Estates by the entireties are not created by a conveyance to husband
and wife, unless a right of surviorship is provided for. Virginia Code, secs. 2430,
2431.
Washington. Estates acquired by husband and wife after marriage are com-
munity property. Rem. & Ball. Ann. Wash. Codes and Statutes, sec. 5917.
West Virginia. Husband and wife do not take an estate by the entireties, but
as joint tenants, in a conveyance to them of an estate of inheritance. McNeeley
v. South Penn Oil Co., 52 W. Va. 616 (1903). But if the estate granted is only
a life estate, they take by entireties and the survivor takes the whole for the
balance of his or her life. Irvin v. Stover, 67 W. Va. 356 (i9io).
Wisconsin. The common law estate by the entireties does not exist in this
state, and a conveyance to husband and wife, therefore, creates a joint tenancy
Bassler v. Rewodlinski, 130 Wis. 26 (19o6).
For general notes on the estate by the entireties, see 3o L. R. A. 333; Io L. R .A.
(N.S.) 463; L. R. A., 1915C 396; ,8 Am. Dec. 377; 13 R. C. L. o99.
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to show that he reserved the property merely to secure performance
of the contract by the buyer; and that, therefore, the loss fell upon
the seller. Does this decision conform with the intended construction
of the Sales Act?
As to the risk of loss, there is the accepted general rule that the
risk follows the title.' It is seen, however, that, regarding retention of
title as security for performance by the vendee, this general rule is
subject to two marked exceptions; first, in what are known as
conditional sales, and, secondly, in shipments under bills of lading
made out to the vendor himself or to his order.
2
Under conditional sales the vendee immediately gets the beneficial
use and all enjoyment, as if he had bought the article outright and
given a mortgage back to the vendor, in which case it is clear that
the risk is upon the vendee. The consideration in such sales is
paid for the delivery of the goods, with the right to acquire title by
payment, so that although the subject of the sale is destroyed before
title passes, the vendee has acquired all he has a right to and is liable
for full payment of the price.3 The vendor has done all that he is
obliged to do. This point has been subject to considerable discussion
but the weight of authority seems to uphold the rule stated above
and to place the risk of loss upon the buyer.
4
This principle applies also to sales in which title has been reserved
in the vendor by means of the bill of lading. In conditional sales
the title is expressly reserved; in the bill of lading cases the title is
impliedly reserved by the form of the bill. The effect is the same
in both cases,-upon the payment of the price agreed upon the vendee
may acquire title. The beneficial interest in the goods vests in the
buyer upon shipment. If in the meantime the goods enhance in
value, such increase will be to the benefit of the buyer. So, also,
if the value were to decrease, or the goods be totally destroyed,
such loss should fall upon the buyer. The shipment is upon his
order and for his sole benefit, and the risk of loss in such cases must
also be his.
In England it will be noticed that the Sale of Goods Act does not
expressly cover the facts of this case, but the common law sustains
the view expressed above. Browne v. Hare5 is a case of very similar
facts. There was a sale of ten tons of oil to be shipped "free on
board" at Rotterdam. Part of the oil was shipped according to the
contract and the bill of lading made the oil deliverable to "shippers'
order." The vendor indorsed the bill to the vendee and forwarded
it with a bill of exchange drawn on the vendee. On the following
'Terry v. Wheeler, 25 N. Y. 520 (x862).2Williston, Sales, p. 458.
'American Soda Fountain Company v. Vaughn, 69 N. J. L. 582 (1903); La
Valley v. Ravenna, 78 Vt. 152 (1904).
'Chicago Railway Equipment Company v. Merchants' Bank, 336 U. S. 268
(889); Jessup v. Fairbanks, Morse & Co., 38 Ind. App. 673 (I9O6); American
Soda Fountain Company v. Vaughn, supra, note 3; La Valley v. Ravenna,
supra, note 3; Whitlock v. Auburn Lumber Company, 145 N. C. 120 (1907);
Burnley v. Tufts, 66 Miss. 48 (1888).
53 H. & N. (Eng.) 484 (1858).
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night the ship was wrecked, and the oil lost. The court made the
distinction between the beneficial interest in the buyer and the mere
title for security in the seller, and held the risk of loss to be upon the
buyer.6
The New York decisions are in accord with the view expressed
above, holding the buyer liable for loss when title is reserved merely
as security. In Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank v. Logan7 the facts
were similar. The court made the same distinction as to the benefi-
cial interest and stated that, as any benefits arising in the meantime
would fall upon the buyer, so too must any loss fall upon him. In
the case of the National Cash Register Company v. South Bay Asso-
ciation" the court, upon the destruction of a cash register sold under
a conditional sale and before payment, held that "the plaintiff had
nothing further to do; the title was retained merely as security for
the unpaid purchase." Loss was placed upon the buyer.9
It is clear, therefore, that the Sales Act is declaratory of the common
law, that where title is retained as security only the risk of loss is
upon the buyer, the basis of such theory being that such transaction
is in effect a sale with a mortgage given back. The risk should logi-
cally be upon the one holding the beneficial interest rather than the
bare legal title. The Sales Act has expressly provided for it, and,
apart from the statutes, the weight of authority supports the same
result.
Although the holding in the case here in question may be justified
by virtue of the conflict of authority, it seems that the court too
hastily dismissed the question by saying that there was no evidence
to show that title was retained merely as security. What other
object could possibly have been in view? The vendor's instructions
were to turn over the bill of lading upon payment of the draft, thus
clearly and almost conclusively indicating that reservation was
merely for security. It is clear that the vendor would have given
title upon performance by the vendee, namely, payment. In section
20 of the Uniform Sales Act is found another clear statement which
would seem to apply to this case. That section states that "where
goods are shipped, and by the bill of lading the goods are deliverable
to the seller or his agent, the seller thereby reserves the property
in the goods. But if, except for the form of the bill of lading, the
property would have passed to the buyer upon shipment of the goods,
the seller's property in the goods shall be deemed to be only for the
purpose of securing performance by the buyer of his obligations
under the contract." It seems, therefore, that the holding in the
principal case is contrary to the intended construction of the Sales
Act and that the loss should have fallen upon the buyer.
Wayne C. Selby, '8.
6See also Mirabita v. Imperial Ottoman Bank, L. R. 3 Exch. D. (Eng.) 164(1878).
774 N. Y. 568 (1878).
864 Misc. (N. Y.) 125 (19o9).9Accord, Comer v. Cunnngham, 77 N. Y. 391 (1879).
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Torts: Duty of One Repairing Automobiles to Look Out for Passing
Cars.-In the recent case of Humes v. Schaller, 99 Atl. (R. I.) 55
(i9g6), the proof was that the plaintiff had got out of his automobile
which had been stopped on a country highway, and was directing
his attention to a punctured tire. He did not anticipate and guard
against being hit by any passing cars. As a result of the careless
driving of the defendant he was hit by the latter's car, although
there was ample room to pass. The court held that the law does not
require-one in a situation of this kind to "anticipate and guard against
being run over by an auto, having ample room to pass. In other
words, that the law does not require an ordinarily prudent man to
expect such carelessness." The question was whether any care
at all is required of one in the position of the plaintiff. A similar
case is Boick v. Bissell,' in which a teamster, who had seen the defend-
ant approaching, was struck while engaged in binding on his load.
It was held in this case that, as a matter of law, there was no
negligence on the part of the plaintiff, and the case was sent to the
jury. The attitude of the court was the same in Nead v. Roscoe
Lumber Company,2 where the plaintiff was struck and injured by a
passing wagon, while his horse was at a watering trough, and he
stood three or four minutes engaged in tightening the cover at the
rear of the cart, without looking behind him. 3
In these cases the care imposed on the plaintiff would seem to be
practically none at all, and it is to be asked if this is entirely reconcil-
able with the decisions holding that persons working or standing in
city streets are required to use reasonable care under the circum-
stances.4 In a recent New York case5 a photographer, who stood
on the curb of the street, taking a picture, with his head covered
with a focussing cloth for five minutes, was held to be guilty of
negligence as a matter of law, which precluded him from recovering
for injuries received when a vehicle ran into him. As in the case
in hand, the plaintiff used no care, depending upon the careful-
ness of the defendant in avoiding him. It seems that there is some
analogy between a man thus standing with his head covered, so
as not to see the defendant, and a man standing in the highway,
looking down, regardless of passing cars. The one, devoting his
entire attention to taking a picture, deliberately blinds his eyes;
the other, devoting his entire attention to fixing a tire, theoretically
blinds his eyes, so far as any other use is contemplated. In regarding
the relative safety of their positions, that of the photographer was
apparently the safer. In each case the plaintiff used no care, depend-
ing entirely upon that of the defendant. Does it not seem slightly
irreconcilable that in one case the plaintiff's lack of care barred his
18o Mich. 260 (18go).
254 App. Div. (N. Y.) 621 (i9oo).
3And see Rathmeyer v. Mehl, 60 Atl. (N. J.) 40 (19o).4Cottonv. Wood, 8 C. B. (n. s.) (Eng.) 568 (186o); Quirk v. Holt, 99 Mass. 164
(1868); Evans v. Adams Express Company, 122 Ind. 362 (1889); Gerhard v. Ford
Motor Car Company, 155 Mich. 618 (1909); Southern R. R. Company v. Cap-
linger, 151 Ky. 749 (1913).
GMastin v. The City of New York, 201 N. Y. 8i (1911).
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action, whereas in the other care was not required? In Lyons v.
Avis', the jury were charged that it was the duty of one using the
street for the purpose of mixing mortar and filling his hod with the
same to use diligence, especially in looking out for teams. Here
again some care is required as a matter of law, the question only
going to the jury as to whether sufficient care was used. And so in
other cases of a similar nature some care is required.7
The only possible distinguishing feature appears to be that in a
country road danger is less likely to exist, and that the care of an
ordinarily prudent man would be very slight or practically negligible.
But that the care of a reasonably prudent man should be less upon a
country highway than in a crowded city street does not justify a
holding that no care at all is to be required on the country road.
The great extent of automobile traffic would seem to require of
anyone standinginaroad at least slight care regarding the movements
of vehicles in the road.
L. W. Dawson, 'ip.
Tort: Mutilation of a Will.-In the case of Dulin v. Bailey, go
S. E. (N. C.) 689 (rpr6), the plaintiff brought an action in tort,
alleging that after the death of one W. A. Bailey, the defendants
conspired to deprive the plaintiff and others of the benefits of the
decedent's last will, by removing from the will the clause providing
for the legacy to the plaintiff and the others and substituting other
provisions for it. As a result a former will was admitted to probate.
The plaintiff did not seek to attack the will thus admitted to probate,
or to probate the will which she alleged to be a subsequent will,
nor was she seeking to recover anything from Bailey's estate; she
brought an action of tort against those who has so altered and
defaced the will as to deprive her of her legacy. The plaintiff alleged
in her complaint that she did not attempt to establish the second will
because she could not prove the entire contents thereof, as she would
be required to do, under the rule obtaining in that state, in order to
admit the will to probate.' The court held that a demurrer to this
complaint should have been overruled, citing two old English cases.2
The court further based its decision on the broad ground that the
plaintiff, not being able to establish the entire contents of the
destroyed will and therefore unable to prove it, should be allowed
to recover of the defendants for the wrong done by the conspiracy
and destruction of the clause in the will providing for a legacy to the
plaintiff, and to recover as damages the amount of the legacy of
which she was deprived.
Cases of this sort are extremely rare, probably because any altera-
tion of an instrument by a third person is a mere spoliation and has
65 App. Div. (N. Y.) 193 (1896).
7Hartfield v. Roper, 21 Wendell (N. Y.) 615 (1839); Barker v. Savage, 45 N.Y.
191 (1871); Williams v. Grealy, 112 Mass. 79 (1873); Dimuria v. Seattle Transfer
Company, 5o Wash. 633 (19o8).
'In re Hedgepeth, 15o N. C. 245 (1909).2Tucker v. Phipps, 3 Atk. (Eng, Chanc.) 358 (1746); Barnesley v. Powel, i
Ves. Sen. (Eng. Chanc.) 283 (749).
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no legal effect whatsoever3; and, in like manner, the alteration or
mutilation of a will by a third person without the testator's consent
is deemed a spoliation and is of no legal effect and the contents of the
obliterated portion may be proved by extrinsic evidence.4 Moreover,
when the spoliation could be proved, an interested party would be
more anxious to have the instrument corrected than to recover
against the wrongdoer.
The English cases cited hardly seem precedents for the holding
in this case. In the older of the two, Tucker v. Phipps5, the action
was against the executor for a legacy. It was claimed and admitted
that the executor had suppressed the will so that it had never been
probated; and because of this suppression, the plaintiff was allowed
to recover the legacy, although the usual rule was not to allow a suit
for a legacy against an executor before the probate of the will. In
the other case, Barnesley v. Powel,6 the plaintiff by a decree in chancery
was released from the probate of a forged will, the probate having
been obtained by fraud.
There is a Massachusetts case, Thayer v. Kitchen,7 almost directly
in point. In this case the plaintiff sued in tort, claiming that the
defendant had suppressed or destroyed the will of one Rolland, by
which the plaintiff had been left a large legacy. It was held that
the plaintiff had no cause of action in tort, even granting the truth
of his allegations, for the reason that the probate court had power to
pass upon all matters relating to wills, 8 and because its decrees
were binding on all other courts; but more especially because by
statute9 it was provided that one who concealed a will should be
confined until he produced or accounted for it; and if the probate
court found that he had concealed a will, he was further made liable
to a person for any injury which that person might have sustained
through his failure to produce the will. The court held that no
remedy besides the statutory one could be given, saying, "Other
relief will be refused where plain and adequate statutory redress is
available."
Because of this statute, Thayer v. Kitchen cannot be said to be
absolutely contra to the principal case. The decision in the principal
case seems correct on the ground stated by the court: "Even if
there had been no precedent, it would seem that, upon the principle
of justice that there is 'no wrong without a remedy', the plaintiff is
entitled to maintain this action, if, as she alleges, the defendants
conspired and destroyed the subsequent Will in which the legacy was
left her. If she cannot prove the destroyed will because unable to
32 Corpus Juris 1233; 36 Cyc. 807; cases there cited.4Collagan v. Burns, 57 Me. 449 (1867); Monroe v. Huddart, 79 Neb. 569
(I9O7); Matter of Gartland, 6o Misc. (N. Y.) 31 (i9O8); Page, Wills (ist Ed.),
sec. 3oi.
sSupra, note 2.
'Supra, note 2.
7Tbayer v. Kitchen, 200 Mass. 382 (19o9).8Gale v. Nickerson, 144 Mass. 415 (1887); Crocker v. Crocker, 198 Mass. 4o1
(19o8).
$Mass. Revised Laws of 1902, C. 135, secs. 14, 15.
THE CORNFELL LAW QUARTERLY
prove the entire contents thereof, surely she is entitled to recover
of the defendants for the wrong they have done her by the conspiracy
and destruction of the will, and the measure of her damages will be
the legacy of which she was deprived." This may be based upon
the principle that an intentional doing of an act which is calculated
to cause damage to another, and which causes such damage, if done
without just cause or excuse, is an actionable tort.10 Both in this
case and in Thayer v. Kitchen, there was not only an act calculated
to cause damage and actually causing such damage, but the act was
intended to cause the damage and was besides illegal. The North
Carolina court has made a new application of the general principle
stated above; in Thayer v. Kitchen, recovery was refused because the
plaintiff had failed to establish in a probate court the fact that a will
had been destroyed, which was a necessary step if he was to have
an action for damages; but it seems probable that in the absence of
statute recovery would have been given. North Carolina has a
statute" making the concealment or destruction of a will a misde-
meanor, though this statute was not mentioned in the principal case.
It would seem that a tort action on the case, as allowed in the
principal case, would in all cases be sufficient for the protection of the
legatees; and the action would probably be allowed in all jurisdictions
where a statute does not interfere, since the general tendency at
present is to follow the principle laid down above, that the doing of
an act likely to cause damage, and actually causing such damage,
is a tort, if done without a good excuse or justification.
An exceedingly nice question, however, arises as to the amount
and measure of damages. The court in the principal case states
that "the measure of damages will be the amount of the legacy of
which she [the plaintiff] was deprived"; but the legacy might not
have been satisfied, even had the will been proved; for either the
estate might have been insolvent, or the sum of all the legacies might
have exceeded the assets of the estate. It would seem that the
plaintiff, to prove damage, would have to prove the amount of the
debts against the estate and the amount of each of the legacies;
and if she could do this, she would have fulfilled the requirements for
proving the will. This question was not raised in the principal case,
which arose upon demurrer to the complaint; but the court suggests
that a heavy burden of proof would rest upon the plaintiff. The
matter is a difficult one, and it seems doubtful whether in the principal
case the plaintiff could prove any actual damage.
Richard H. Brown, '19.
Torts: Proximate Cause.-An instance of the difficulty encount-
ered in attempting to apply any of the numerous tests for legal
causation is presented in Perry v. Rochester Lime Company, 2Z9 N. Y.
6o (zp.6). In the rear of defendant's place of business ran the Erie
1 0Mogul S. S. Co. v. McGregor, L. R. 23 Q. B. D. 598 (1889); Tuttle v. Buck,
107 Minn. 145 (909).
"Pell's Revisal of North Carolina of 19o8, sec. 351o.
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Canal from which the warehouse was separated by a narrow strip
of land belonging to the state. Close to the warehouse but upon
the public land the defendant maintained an unmarked wooden
chest in which it was accustomed to store nitro-gylcerin caps. The
explosive was put up in small tin boxes, marked "Blasting caps,
handle with care," which were packed in larger wooden boxes with
loose sliding covers. As a rule the chest was kept locked but it was
left open on the day in question. Such storage of explosives without
a permit was a violation of city ordinances. Two of the plaintiff's
intestate's boy friends, aged twelve and thirteen, were accustomed to
play and fish in this locality and, coming there and finding the chest
unlocked, abstracted one of the wooden boxes and carried it home.
On the next day three boys, the eight year old plaintiff's intestate and
the two original wrongdoers, experimented upon their find with the
aid of a bonfire, which venture resultedin the violent death of the trio.
The court affnms a judgment which denied defendant'sliability onthe
ground that the defendant's wrong, the existence of which the court
admits, was not the legal cause of the accident. Thestandardadopted
as the test for causation is the "reasonable foreseeability" rule. It is
held that the damage was not such as a reasonable man ought to
be expected to foresee as a result of the negligence charged.
Through consideration of a vast number of cases legal scholars
have attempted to frame a test by which courts and juries may be
guided in tracing the chain of causation in a given instance. Those
tests which are most .commonly cited by the courts are, in brief, the
"foreseeability" rule and the "probable consequence" rule, neither
of which is legally sound, although they may serve to set the minds
of the court or jury going in the right direction. What force has
an instruction to the effect that a negligent person is responsible for
"all the damage that a reasonable man ought to foresee as naturally
resulting from his act?" Aside from its indefiniteness, this test is
inaccurate. Could a defendant be expected to foresee, as a result
of the negligent maintenance of a hole in the pavement, that a wagon
would be broken as a result of dropping into the hole; that the driver
would be dragged over the dashboard and that injuries would result
to the driver from exposure during the time required to look up
another horse, report the accident and go home?' Yet the causal
chain seems complete and the court so held.
Like criticism must be made of the "natural and probable conse-
quence rule" which is usually stated thus: "The defendant is
liable for all damages which were the natural and probable
consequence of his negligence." A probability is something that is
more likely than not to happen. As pointed out by Professor Jere-
miah Smith,2 although the chances of a particular contingency's
resulting from a negligent act may be only one in ten, yet the defend-
ant would not be exonerated on the ground that his act was not the
legal cause of the injury. A further exception to the "probable
consequence" test must be made in the case of intentional injuries.
1Ehrgott v. City of New York, 96 N. Y. 264 (1884).
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The defendant throws a stone at a group of individuals from a great
distance, hoping that he can hit one of them, but not believing that
he can possibly throw that far. One of the group is, in fact, injured
by the missile. The defendant does not escape liability however
improbable the damage may have been.
Professor Joseph W. Bingham submits that the legal duty to
exercise care is imposed to the end that certain happenings may be
avoided and suggests that the test for proximate cause is whether
or not the injury was one of the happenings designed to be avoided.3
This is, however, merely a statement of the "foreseeability" rule in
more inviting form. If a duty is imposed that certain happenings
may be avoided, those happenings, as a matter of course, must be
able to be foreseen, and we arrive at our starting point. Professor
Jeremiah Smith concludes an able article in the Harvard Law Review'
by proposing that a negligent act is the legal cause of an injury if it
was a "substantial factor" in producing that injury. The proposi-
tion is too indefinite to be of much value. It, too, is inaccurate
when placed under scrutiny. In Miller v. Bahmmuller5 the plaintiff
who was sitting on a step beside an open cellarway, was kicked by the
defendant and fell into the opening which was negligently maintained
by the defendant, and received the injuries complained of. It was
contended that the maintenance of the cellarway was at least a
concurrent cause of the injury, but the court held correctly to the
contrary. The opening was a substantial factor in producing the
injury but just as certainly was not a legal cause of it.
It is submitted that no standard has been or can be framed to
meet the peculiar difficulties that the question presents; that it
is for the jury to say in each particular instance whether or not the
defendant ought in good conscience to be held for the consequences
of his careless behavior without regard to some fallacious test. As a
practical matter the jury would probably come to the same conclu-
sion, rule or no rule, and no rule would seem to be preferable to a
bad one.
In connection with the principal case, however, the foregoing
argument is superfluous. The test used is the "foreseeability"
standard, which is really too favorable to the defendant. But,
using this standard, it is submitted that the court erred in affirming
the judgment for the defendant. The defendant ought to have fore-
seen that just such a contingency would result from its promiscuous
storage of such dangerous material. The predilection of the American
boy for carrying off loose articles is too patent for comment. It
does not appear that the boys knew the nature of the article at the
time of the theft. To the contention that the defendant could not
be expected to foresee that the plaintiff's intestate, a playmate,
would be blown up, the well-known gregarious tendency of youth
should be a complete answer. Although injury to this particular boy
could not be anticipated, the defendant was, to borrow Prof. Bing-
39 Columbia Law Review i6.4Supra, note 2.
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ham's expression, an "inchoate wrongdoer" with regard to everyone
in the community, and responsible to whomsoever might be injured.
The outstanding fault with the rules regarding legal causec that
are in common use is that they are too narrow. Negligence may be
the legal cause of an injury that was neither probable nor foreseeable.
Donald H. Hershey, 'i8.
